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ABSTRACT
Political Corruption In Sub-Sahara Africa:
A Comparative Assessment Of Kenya,
Nigeria, And Zaire/Congo

by
Kennedy Geoffrey Ondieki
Dr. Mehran Tamadonfar, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Legally, politically, academically, and culturally,
political corruption eludes clear, precise, and
comprehensive definition.

It is a universal phenomenon

that afflicts every political system.
things to different people.

It means different

It manifests itself in a

variety of ways in both developed and developing countries.
It is considered

morally, economically, politically, and

socially devastating.

This thesis addresses the dynamics of

political corruption in sub-Saharan Africa and explores some
central and perplexing questions.

How is it that one of the

most serious problems in sub-Saharan Africa receives such
limited attention despite its magnitude, pervasiveness, and
consequences?

Is political corruption a cultural

characteristic of the African continent?

What do the

iii
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peoples of

Africa think about political corruption?

What are their historical, cultural, and contemporary
explanations for corruption, i.e., its definitions, causes,
effects, and remedies?

Indeed, we cannot understand

political corruption in sub-Saharan Africa outside the
framework of the legacy of colonialism, neo-colonialism, the
"Big Men", tribalism and nepotism, underdevelopment, and
frustrated economies.
detail.

These factors are discussed in

Three country case studies— Kenya, Nigeria, and

Zaire/Congo—

are discussed to demonstrate how corruption

can frustrate, impede, and paralyze all developmental
efforts, administrative performance, economic growth, and
social and political integration in Africa.
critical remedies are suggested

Finally, some

to eradicate political

corruption in sub-Saharan Africa.

IV
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INTRODUCTION
Corruption is an ancient phenomenon and a universal
malady that afflicts all societies and polities in one form
or another.

It is endemic and pervasive in politics, and

hardly any is government totally immune from corruption.

It

is particularly rampant in post-independent Africa, and it
has

reached alarming proportions.

It has permeated every

sector of government and society as a whole; it has become
part and parcel of the African lifestyle.

Since it has

grown in such gigantic proportions and affects all spheres
of life— political, social, economic, and cultural— it is a
dilemma that urgently demands the continent's serious
attention.^

According to Ronald E. Wraith and Edgar

Simpkins, corruption in Africa,
flourishes as luxuriantly as the bush and weeds which
it so much resembles, taking the goodness from the soil
and suffocating the growth of plants which have been
carefully and expensively bred and tended.‘
Political corruption in politics and leadership is a
common practice in contemporary African political systems.
Scholars and

commentators argue that through the fabric of

political life runs the scarlet thread of bribery and
corruption.

Andreski Stanislav, in particular, states that
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"venality pervades through and through the fabric of African
states"', and like an ogre it refuses to let go of African
communities, assert Kivutha Kibwana et al.*
In recent years, the notoriously affected countries in
sub-Saharan Africa— Nigeria, Congo/Zaire, Ghana, Sierra
Leone, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Kenya, Malawi,
and Zambia— have had numerous episodes of governmental and
individual misdeeds reported in both the local and
international press.

These reports heavily indict the

African elite, top government officials, presidents (the
"Big Men"), civil servants, businessmen, and even the public
with the perpetration of such corrupt activities as
embezzlement, fraud, kickbacks, theft, misappropriation of
funds, bribery and extortion, report padding, tribalism, and
nepotism.5
Interestingly enough, even African leaders, the elite,
officials in top government institutions/echelons, and
intellectuals acknowledge the existence of such high levels
of government corruption.

To control or alleviate this

problem— the illegal practices and immoral activities— many
African states have, in conjunction with their judicial
systems, formed special anti-corruption squads and created
committees for national inquiries to these activities and
bring the wrongdoers to justice.

Unfortunately, these anti

corruption institutions are all too impotent because, all

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3

too often, these agencies are under the thumb of the "Strong
Men" and thus are controlled by those most heavily involved
in the corrupt activities.*
The sad fact is that political corruption keeps raging
on unabated, eating the very fabric of African societies—
from "top political levels to the family unit".’ Its impact
is far-reaching resulting in underdevelopment, political
unrest, economic decline, unemployment, social malaise,
crime and violence, and other human miseries.
The most perplexing questions posed are:

(1) How is it

that one of the most serious problems in Africa remains an
understudied phenomenon, despite its magnitude,
pervasiveness, and consequences? (2) Why is it that for
decades political corruption in Africa received such limited
attention from researchers? and (3) What has been done
recently to correct this crisis?
questions are hard to pin down.

The answers to these
Perhaps Wraith and

Simpkins's succinct explanation tackles this dilemma when
they eloquently write that:
It is frustrating to try to write, one's phrases
wrapped in a cocoon of ambiguity, about something which
everybody knows, which no one dares openly acknowledge,
which may lead to serious trouble if one is in the
least incautious.®
Indeed, the above statement extrapolates in a nutshell
two reasons why scholars are disinterested in African
corruption.

First, the shortcomings and risks that are
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involved in undertaking such a sensitive and delicate issue
outweigh the benefits.

Second, political corruption is

widely accepted as a "necessary fact of life" in most of
African nations.

In fact, bribery and venality are viewed

as essential ingredients that turn the wheels of government
and facilitate business transactions.

Therefore, these

facts of life or biases have contributed to thwarting local
and international researchers from studying this problem
and, thus, possibly provide remedies.*
Theoretically speaking, when the concept of corruption
is placed under social science's macroscopic lens, it
indeed, proves broad and complicated, because it involves
various interpretations and meanings.

Therefore, the answer

to the question why corruption has been understudied in
Africa and why many scholars for decades have been
discouraged from undertaking this phenomenon runs the gamut
from the risks involved to lack of information and
accessibility of sources, from lack of consensus among
scholars on the precise definition of corruption to lack of
scientific methods relevant to studying this subject on a
universal or cross-cultural basis.
However, because of the severe impact of political
corruption in sub-Saharan Africa, numerous scholars,
especially those who are brave enough, as well as those who
place primacy on the substance over method, have in recent
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years ventured to study this subject regardless of the
consequences, opting to understand the phenomenon and
provide remedies.
The question that arises is:

Why has Africa become the

"poster boy" for the study of political corruption?

Simply

put, why are scholars and students of corruption paying
special attention to contemporary Africa?

First and

foremost, there is a general consensus among scholars that
corruption is a global problem whose effects are farreaching.

According to Syed Hussein Alatas,

The problem with corruption is trans-systemic; that is,
it inheres in all social systems— feudalism,
capitalism, communism, and socialism. It affects all
classes of society; all state organizations, monarchies
and republics; all situations in war and peace; all age
groups; both sexes; and all times, ancient, medieval,
and modern.
Indeed, on a continent where corruption has "passed the
alarming and entered the fatal stage"^^; where the problem
has transcended individuals and entered the state system;
where the practice is so endemic, pervasive, and viewed as a
fact of life; and where the whole society keeps nipping like
termites at its very scarce natural resources to the extent
of turning the whole continent into a basket case, clearly
studying the manifestations and ramifications of this
disease is, indeed, a step forward toward finding the cure.
Similarly, sub-Saharan Africa is appealing to scholars
and students of political corruption for various reasons.
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James Gibbs Jr., contends that for decades the primary
interest of scholars and academicians focused mainly on the
peoples and cultures of Africa.

Perusing social science

studies and the rich and varied literature on the peoples of
Africa as presented by anthropologists and sociologists, one
is convinced that African corruption was either
insignificant or uninteresting to most scholars.

However,

with the end of the cold war, Africa moved to center stage,
not purely because it is the "home" of human misery, but
also because it is underdeveloped.^*
Furthermore, most scholars generally agree that the
prevalence of political corruption in the newly independent
nations of Africa seriously hinders economic growth and
political development.^®

Therefore, scholars and students

of corruption have not only been lured towards Africa
because of its supposedly open and democratic political
systems that have made it possible and conducive to study
political corruption in contemporary Africa but also because
it is significant to understand its nature and effects.
Additionally, it is argued that, for sub-Saharan
Africa,
The past thirty years have been disastrous. The region
has been beset by famine, drought, civil war, disease,
population explosion, shortage of food, environmental
degradation, a fall in production and exports, massive
governmental indebtedness, and political corruption.
Worse yet, Africa now faces severe competition from
Eastern European countries for scarce international
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aid. Therefore, without finding a cure for corruption,
future economic decline, political unrest, poverty,
human suffering, and cries for self-determination are
inevitable.
Other factors why social scientists are now interested in
studying corruption in sub-Saharan Africa include:

First,

Africa stands highly vulnerable to government corruption
compared to other developing countries^® due to political
and economic instability, ineffective government
institutions, particularly, the judicial system; due to lack
of democratic tradition, political pluralism, and skilled
manpower.
Second, Africa still remains terra incognita, to many
scholars and researchers.

In fact, some of Africa's

"primitive" regions are to-date understudied and hence
undiscovered.

Most of these areas are found in the rural

areas where the majority of people reside.

Indeed, for

decades, scholars and researchers have concentrate their
energies in studying African predicaments

in the urban

centers especially capital cities, but with recent discovery
of rural regions, researchers have began to incorporated
rural and urban areas to understand Africa's problems.
Third, Africa provides lively, fresh, and juicy
episodes of both petty and grand-scale corruption.

These

episodes run the gamut from buying a cup of coffee, lunch,
drinks, to giving bribes in monetary currency to acquire
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jobs or driver's licenses, to offering large kickbacks, or
"percentages" to acquire business licenses or begin a
factory at certain areas or locations in urban centers.
Therefore, these factors have played a key role into
attracting scholars, academicians, and students of political
corruption to probe the ramifications of this phenomenon
with the hope of understanding it, mitagating its impacts,
and setting a precedent on how to study government or
bureaucratic corruption.
In spite of the endeavors to study corruption in subSaharan Africa, social scientists still face some disturbing
questions:

How does one study corruption where it is said

be so prevalent?

Where does one draw a line between a gift

and a bribe where the two phrases are often used
synonymously?

How does one tell corrupt acts from normal

acts where laws are often unclear or mute?

Which criteria

are relevant and applicable to studying corruption?

With

these factors in mind, a thorough theoretical, conceptual,
and methodological framework are of utmost importance to
understanding this phenomenon.

THESIS OBJECTIVES
This thesis analyzes what Africans think about
political corruption.

It examines the nature of corruption,

its causes, effects, and remedies.

It assesses and compares
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corruption in three African countries— Kenya, Nigeria, and
the former Zaire.

The purpose of this thesis is two-fold.

One is to shed some light to undertanding political
corruption from an African perspective.

Two is to show

that, if this problem rages on unabated, it can become a
deadly disease.

Additionally, it is my contention that

political corruption may not rank high in the minds of the
African peoples who daily live with such problems as
poverty, disease, civil war, hunger, tribalism, and
illiteracy; nonetheless, it is a dilemma that requires the
continent's special attention.

Attempts to alleviate "these

problems can only be hampered when citizens lack confidence
in their governments and are distrustful of their officials,
a situation not likely to change so long as corruption
remains at its present l e v e l " . T h i s is the overriding
message I hope to convey in this thesis.
The findings of this research confirm that corruption
is indeed the number one problem and the major obstacle to
Africa's economic growth, political development and
integration, and political leadership.

Therefore, it is my

contention that political corruption has ruined Nigeria, the
former Zaire, Kenya, and many other countries in sub-Saharan
Africa.

It also my assertion that, if this trend continues

at its current rate and if sub-Saharan Africa falls short of
sunshine remedies before the end of this century, the whole
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of the African continent will be one big political and
economic basket-case.
The introduction part provides a set of dimensions on
the study of corruption; offers a general overview of
corruption and a theoretical framework and addresses some
key questions and delineates the primary objectives of this
thesis.
Chapter One provides the major conceptual, and
methodological framework necessary for the study of
political corruption.

To provide a broad and comprehensive

analysis of corruption; explores both the Western and nonWestern (indigenous) explanations; discusses various
definitions of political corruption based on legality,
public interest, public opinion, market-oriented and
philosophical views; provides differences between corruption
and political corruption, corruption and bribery, bribery
and gift-giving, corruption and tribalism/nepotism, and
political corruption and culture; and offers descriptive,
prescriptive, and analytic indigenous explanations of
corruption as understood by Africans.

The fact that, the

concept of political corruption precludes a universal
definition and a continental consensus a detailed
comparative analysis of this phenomenon is oftentimes
unachievable and/or myopic.

Therefore, I intend to provide
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a precise "working" (all-African) definition to simplify the
task of operationalizing this concept.
Chapter Two traces the genesis of political corruption
commencing from the Biblical standpoint; Ancient and Roman
medieval Rome; modern Europe and North American
perspectives; to Middle-Eastern and African purview.

This

chapter intends to show that corruption is as old as mankind
and their governments.
Chapter Three delineates the genesis and development of
political corruption and discusses its causes from both
external and internal perspectives.

Additionally, two

schools of thought (international and national) and the
dependency theory are analyzed in endeavoring to search for
the underlying reasons for corruption.

Therefore, the

causes of corruption in sub-Saharan African states are drawn
from a variety of factors— the legacy of colonialism and
neo-colonialism, tribalism and nepotism, the centralization
of state structures, the "Big Man" syndrome, lack of state
accountability and transparency, and simply due to personal
avarice and greed and, of course, other physical realities.
Chapter Four examines the nuts and bolts of Africa's
paternalistic and neo-tribal models of leadership that
contribute to corruption.

Indeed, in almost every African

society, paternalism, clientalism, and tribalism still
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remain the defining features of politics and leadership.
Due to lack of a sense of national identity that transcends
tribalism or ethnicity, current political leaders play the
"tribal card" to rule and/or remain in power.

Also it shows

that even among some charismatic leaders— Kwame Nkrumah,
Patrice Lumumba, Jomo Kenyatta, and Nelson Madikizela
Mandela leadership styles and the cult of personality
were/are replicas of tribal forms of leadership.
Chapter Five discusses the economic, social and
political impacts of political corruption and ascertains
that corruption is indeed the major impediment to
development and the primary cause for sub-Saharan Africa's
economic decline, political instability, and its many other
manmade miseries.
Chapter Six provides three country case studies from
three different regions in sub-Saharan Africa.

The first

one is Kenya, once Africa's shining star and according to
many people a country that was destined to succeed in East
Africa.

Second is Nigeria, once Africa's economic

powerhouse blessed with oil and a leading star in West
Africa.

Last is the former Zaire, a country that was

blessed with natural resources including diamonds.
Copper, and Iron ore that became a kleptocratic state in the
midst of Central Africa.

This chapter shows that, although

these countries are far away from each other and have
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different forms of government, one thing they share in
common is high-scale political corruption.
Chapter Seven offers some feasible theoretical and
practical remedies appropriate for eradicating or reducing
political corruption in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa.
Additionally, it provides some conclusions and findings.
One of this conclusions is that, without sunshine mechanisms
and measures or "a magic bullet" to control political
corruption before the end of this century, sub-Saharan
Africa is going to be nothing but a big basket-case.
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CHAPTER 1

POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A CONCEPTUAL AND
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
"Truth is whatever promotes your government. If
something is not favorable to your country, then it
isn't true and you should not publish falsehoods".
— Quoted in David Lamb, The Africans
Research on political corruption and its causes and
consequences has been lamentably insular.

Studies on

systemic corruption, for instance, have been limited to a
handful of developed countries, specifically Great Britain
and the United States.

The major reason for this cultural

bias has been attributed to the chronic shortage of
information and/or access to the major primary sources and
historical data.

For decades social scientists,

academicians, and especially students of political
corruption have been faced with severe obstacles in
undertaking this phenomenon.^
These problems are a result of either the non-existence
of adequate information and/or government redtape— data
hidden by parties concerned.

Consequently, any attempt to

understand the nature of political corruption, its causes
and its impacts, remains provincial at best and, at worst,
subjective and filled with unproven theories.In the absence of primary sources against which to
16
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test and evaluate specific patterns or attributes of
corruption pertinent to drawing some objective and concrete
generalizations, efforts to study and understand corruption
are often "guided by intuition and political expediency".^
Here, a cultural analogy may be appropriate: "One man's
terrorist is to another a liberator" or as John Peters and
Susan Welch state, "what may be corrupt to one citizen,
scholar, or public official is just politics to another,or
indiscretion to a third".“ Put simply, what some observers
may call corruption may be just a normal practice.

THE MAJOR OBSTACLES TO THE STUDY OF CORRUPTION
The question is:

Why is it so difficult for social

scientists to study political corruption in Third World
nations, specifically contemporary African governments?
Robert Klitgaard probably sums it up best when he states
that :
Researchers find it increasingly complex and
frustrating to empirically study government corruption
because the parties involved have every reason to keep
data hidden and governments are reluctant to allow
foreigners and even their own citizens to work on such
a sensitive question. Consequently, academic debates
over the toxic and tonic properties of corruption tend
to rely too much upon anecdotes, hypothetical cases,
and speculative linkages between corruption and the
future social outcomes.^
Obviously sources and accessibility are the prime
obstacles that scholars face.

It is Rory Miller's
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contention that oftentimes the documentation on this subject
has been sparse in official publications and records.
Research in local archives which might uncover the lower
level of politics, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and other
government institutions has commenced only in recent years.
Consequently, much of the available evidence on corruption
comes from the archives of foreign governments, journalists,
scholars, businessmen, and travelers who at some point are
forced to compromise with the endemic corruption which they
encounter in Third World countries, particularly those in
Africa.°
Obviously, relying heavily on Western scholars and
sources introduces yet another bias in the study.

However,

with the present state of knowledge, these scholars probably
offer one of the most fruitful ways of developing an
analysis of the structure and dynamics of political
corruption in post-independent Africa.^
Pertaining to corrupt government elites in Africa, and
especially those in power, Kole Omotoso claims that they get
away with their corruption unpublished.®

Furthermore, those

who get prosecuted walk free or receive minor punishment.
The primary reason why African researchers are discouraged
from unearthing and publishing government corruption is
xenophobia or fear of government repression.

Many who brave

to openly talk or write about systemic corruption often pay
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with their lives.

Recent examples of Nigerian poet and

anti-corruption crusader Ken Saro Wiwa's public guillotining
and former Kenya Minister for Foreign Affairs Robert Ouko's
ghastly assassination serve as backdrops.
Other difficulties and dilemmas lie in the
circumstantial nature of much of the evidence.

For example,

Africa did not have a radical press of the kind that exposed
"Old Corruption" in early 19th century Britain.

Similarly,

many episodes of alleged corruption at the higher levels of
government and key records are often missing, hidden, or
ignored by scholars.®
There is also the difficulty of drawing a line through
the hazy area that lies between outright bribes and
extortion on the one hand, and the relationship of
clientalism, kinship, and tribal ties that characterize
African political life on the other.

Therefore, as long

as researchers and students of corruption encounter a major
problem of differentiating a bribe from a gift, or a corrupt
activity from normal lifestyle, any attempt to grasp this
phenomenon may blurred or deterred entirely.
In contrast, pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa, Kivutha
Kibwana et al., contend that most social scientists were
particularly disinterested in undertaking the study of
political corruption because of the way African political
systems were structured.

They assert that "...prior to
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1990, most African countries were either under military rule
or single party governments and/or lacked adequate
information or access to primary data on both foreign and
local researchers".^^ As a result, most of the information
found about corruption in Africa relied heavily on a media
that only occasionally exposed government scandal and often
lacked authenticity, objectivity, and scientificity.
Another global factor that contributes to the
complexity of studying political corruption includes lack of
consensus among social scientists on the definition of
corruption, lack of the approach and method on how to study
corruption, and lack of relevance and applicability of some
explanations.

Specifically, due to lack of a germane cross-

cultural paradigm necessary to study this phenomenon, the
end result has been heated debates and disagreements among
social scientists that dominated the literature of political
corruption. 1-

THE WESTERN AND NON-WESTERN EXPLANATIONS OF CORRUPTION
This problem is largely attributed to the scholars'
political, economic, and social environments.

Depending on

the cultural orientation and background of a particular
researcher (Western or non-Western) , it is highly likely
that he or she will define and explain corruption based on
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his or her purview— culture and understanding.

For example,

what an American may see as a bribe may be a gift to an
African.

Similarly, what one scholar may see as behavior

that constitutes corruption to another may be a normal and
acceptable activity.

Additionally, the interpretation or

cultural connotation that one's research may attach to the
concept of corruption may not necessarily be relevant or
applicable to another.

Indeed, where one looks depends up

on where one stands.
Peter DeLeon argues that what is seen as corruption is
"decidedly dependent on societal and cultural norms''.^®
Given the fact that sub-Saharan Africa comprises many
diverse societies and cultures being cautious and sensitive
to how we define or explain corruption is critical.

DeLeon

states that "What transpires in a Latin America, Middle
East, or Asian nation as legitimate, excusable, or at least
accepted business exchanges would be felonies in the United
S t a t e s " . I n the same vein, one can also argue that the
practice of gift-giving may be interpreted by western
observers as bribery and corruption while Africans may
embrace and treat this practice as a normal way of life.
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AFRICANS' JUSTIFICATION OF CORRUPTION
Measured by the modern standards or yardsticks, the
system of government (chiefdoms) in pre-colonial Africa was
deeply and pervasively corrupt just as it was during
colonial and post-colonial eras.

The question is, how do

Africans today justify the endemic and pervasive existence
of corruption?

Indeed, what westerners may call moral

corruption, average Africans may choose to call a parallel
economy— it is not underground, it is a necessity.

Ben

Tahar Jelloun states that "they don't condone it, nor do
they wish to live with it, but they don't confuse
compensation with theft".

He also notes that Africans read

or hear daily of the developed world's systemic scandals and
large-scale corruption, but they see corruption in their
countries as small-scale— on an individual level.

In

developed nations it is no longer compensation for the
people, it is misappropriation of large sums of monies,
embezzlement, fraud, and organized crimes.

Similarly, they

see no correlation between their entirely small-scale and
underdeveloped way of freeing up a file to save time and
create jobs, and the numbered Swiss bank accounts Europeans
and American politicians and businessmen open to stash
payoffs for the compromises they make with parliament or
congress, industrial, and even Mafia figures.^®
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Furthermore, they are miserable and underpaid
bureaucrats engaged in daily struggle so that their
children, family, and relatives can have a normal lifestyle,
education, and a decent life without sadness and poverty.
In fact, most civil servants or bureaucrats do not see
themselves as greedy and selfish but rather they just want
to have their fair share.

Therefore, it is perceived as

entirely legitimate to cut corners and to help one's
relatives and tribesmen survive.

Thus, the issue of

morality and ethics are non-existent.^

This, then, is how

Africans justify corruption— a way of survival.
In sum, due to the lack of information, access to
available data, a universal approach or traveling method
relevant to studying political corruption on a crosscultural basis, and the absence of concrete empirical data
or evidence necessary to evaluate and test certain or
specific variables and patterns of political corruption,
attempts to draw comprehensive generalizations or
explanations to this concept may be blurred and/or difficult
to accomplish.

Additionally, due to the lack of adequate

scientific method to study this subject, the possibility of
relying on anecdotes, hearsay, subjective, and biased
explanations are most likely.

Therefore, our lack of

understanding of political corruption is brought by
cultural, conceptual, and methodological frameworks.
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In contrast, Charles A. Schwartz claims that although
the study of political corruption has advanced in recent
years in terms of its approach and method, there is yet,
however, a gigantic lack of understanding on this subject on
both the elite and non-elite levels.

For instance, scholars

still disagree a great deal about the applicability of some
definitions and explanations regarding the concept of
corruption.

Nonetheless, Schwartz contends that today

researchers use various paradigms to investigate this
phenomenon and arrive at some general consensus and
universal generalizations.

He particularly states that

social scientists have two major tasks and objectives
to change the nature of inquiry from an inquisition of
immoral individuals to an investigation of actual
workings of corruption in the society...to apply system
analysis to these workings with an eye to gaining new
insights into the process of modernization and
political development.1®
For his part, Robert Tignor also admits that most of the
literature on political corruption seeks to define the
concept, its causes, its impacts, and its remedies
regardless of the method— quantitative or qualitative.^®
Arguing from these scholars, especially that of Syed Hussein
Alatas, it is critical for researchers and students of
corruption to study this subject as a "universal phenomenon"
in order to clearly see how different factors or patterns of
corruption when put together form a "composite w h o l e " . T h e
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implication from these arguments is that if we increase our
array, height and width, patterns and discourses of
corruption, accommodate other cultures and their
explanations, use holistic approaches, and apply multi
methodology methods such as content analysis, field work,
interviews, surveys, experiments, historical comparative
analysis, western and non-western viewpoints to the study of
political corruption, we are highly likely to reach a
universal consensus and understanding that would enable us
to make comprehensive, accurate, objective, valid, reliable,
and applicable generalizations of this phenomenon.

DATA COLLECTION
In researching and analyzing this thesis, I used
several approaches and methods to probe and arrive at some
conclusions.

These are:

content analysis, field research,

personal interviews, and participant observation.

Where

possible, I conducted my project by traveling to some parts
of sub-Saharan Africa— Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, and
South Africa.

Oftentimes, the interviews were face-to-face

and the population involved journalists, lawyers,
businessmen, college professors, students, civil servants,
bus and taxi drivers, and the general public.

The

interviews were informal in that I followed no prepared
schedule of questions.

Instead I adopted my questions to
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the interviews accordingly.

In most cases, I benefitted and

garnered more information during my conversations with the
government workers and general public during their leisure
time and social activities especially while watching soccer.
Nigeria and the former Zaire, I was unable to travel to
conduct one-on-one research.

Instead, I interviewed

scholars and students studying and residing in the United
States.

I also relied heavily on content analysis, i.e.,

current materials such as textbooks, magazines, newspapers
and journal articles.
To establish the nature of political corruption, its
historical genesis, the forms in which it manifests itself
in practice, its perceived causes and explanations, its
political and socio-economic consequences, and its remedies,
I sought data and relied heavily upon different scholarly
and journalistic literatures, both Western and non-Western.
I also made use of the international and national schools of
thought and relied on several methods, i.e., content
analysis, field study— participant observation and
interviews.

Most significant, I took note of what people

said constituted political corruption, its causes, effects,
and remedies to shed some light in understanding this
subject.
Although corruption is widely observable in Africa, it
is still regarded as a sensitive and delicate subject, a
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topic that people are not accustomed to speaking about
publicly without looking over their shoulders.

A majority

of Africans still prefer a "silence is golden" stance or a
"don't ask, don't tell" mentality since, discussing
corruption, one does so at his or her

peril.

Even though corruption is an unlawful, criminal
activity, it is nevertheless generally accepted as a normal
way of life in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
discussing it openly can be incriminating.

Still,

Thus, the major

predicament I encountered researching this topic in Africa
was a lack of straight talkers, especially among the African
elites, top government officials, civil servants, and the
public at large.

There was a general hesitation to respond

to most of my questions because of fear of government
repression or the risk of being prosecuted.

Worse still,

the existing information on corruption or reports on
national inquiries on government corruption were hardly
accessible.
Therefore, due to the above dilemmas, I relied
predominately upon current materials— magazines, newspapers
(local and international), reports from United Nations
agencies, non-governmental agencies, and some of their
workers.

While researching this project in Africa,

sometimes I was forced to engage in bribery or the "African
handshake" to access some information concerning government
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documents, or for that matter to get some people,
especially, the civil servants and the public to talk.

The

bribes ranged from cash to "nyama chôma" (a leg of roasted
goat meat) to beer and cigarettes.

After encountering all

these problems and setbacks in collecting data, I realized
that one approach or method was quite inadequate to gather
information in sub-Saharan Africa.

I also found out that

some of my prepared questionnaires were oftentimes
ineffective and/or ignored by the respondents.

The cardinal

reason was, even within Africa, the concept of corruption
means many things to different people.
various methods in this study.

Thus I chose to use

Additionally, due to the

need for a cultural explanation of political corruption, it
seemed particularly important to undertake this phenomenon
with as many approaches and explanations as possible to
grasp what Africans think about political corruption and its
cultural explanations.

Besides, with such a remarkable

topic, this is, of such broad magnitude, and of a variety of
facets and caveats, it would be unrealistic to limit
ourselves to only a single method and explanation.
Therefore, I chose to use various methods in undertaking the
study political corruption.

Because it adds rigor, breadth,

and depth to our understanding.
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DEFINING POLITICAL CORRUPTION
"A concept that is boundless cannot
be rationally defined".
— Franz Neuman, Behemoth. (1943:75)
The explicit significance of the above quotations is:
it is extremely difficult to define the concept of
corruption because it means different things to different
people throughout the globe.

Even though, the meaning of

this phenomenon has many ramifications, it nonetheless,
easily detected because its impacts are far-reaching and
damaging.
In his preface, Robert Williams articulates that:
If you let people know that you are interested in
controlling corruption in developing countries, you may
find some surprising and skeptical reactions. 'Yes they
may tell you that we have heard that corruption is a
big problem in Third World governments. But who is to
say a given act is actually corrupt? Maybe it is
corrupt in your culture, but not theirs. And might not
corruption play a useful role in developing societies?
Doesn't it grease the wheels of commerce, build
political coalitions, and help organizations overcome
red tape? Besides what can you do or anyone else do
about corruption? Like sin, it's everywhere.^
These rhetorical questions together, however, spawn
definitional debate among social scientists and often
dominate the literature of political corruption.
Legally, academically, politically, and culturally,
corruption eludes clear definition.^

Corruption, like

obscenity or democracy may mean different things to
different people, depending on their individual.
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ideological, methodological, and cultural or contextual
viewpoints.^

According to Ernest Harsch, the term

corruption "conjures up certain images but when closely
examined it involves a wide spectrum of practices, of
varying forms and significancies".“ In the same vein,
Robert Williams claims that corruption "resists easy
measurement and simple interpretation".® Therefore, under no
circumstances could corruption be studied in isolation of
politics and power, political institutions and economic
resources, and class and society.
Generally speaking, defining corruption either from a
Western or non-Western context can be very difficult or a
"tedious and dispiriting task".® Any significant attempts to
search for a comprehensive and all-embracing explanation is
oftentimes myopic.

Perhaps Robin Theobald's explanation

captures this dilemma when he graphically writes that:
Corruption like many other forms of behavior when
placed under the scrutiny of social science lens proves
to be an elusive and complex phenomenon: in fact the
more one examines it the more difficult it becomes to
separate corruption from other forms of social
exchange. The task of definition is not made easier by
the fact that corruption by its very nature, is
inseparable from questions of public morality and
morality in general. This has sometimes excited a
tendency to condemn which has impeded objective
analysis. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that
some writers, whilst dealing with the phenomenon in
some detail, have deliberately avoided it.’
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This means that the deeper researchers probe this
phenomenon, the more confusing and complicated it gets.
Furthermore, it is highly likely that researchers may
overlook or ignore the essential components of corruption.
Under these conditions, many scholars and students of
corruption may argue that attempting an all-embracing
definition of the concept of political corruption is indeed
impossible, if not unrealistic.
attempt to provide a

Unfortunately, those who do

precise universal definition

oftentimes limit their focus and approach to certain
patterns of corrupt behavior to arrive at a consensus.
However, scholars who venture into this narrow purview fail
to acknowledge that the concept of corruption is so broad
and ambiguous and that it "assumes many different forms,
levels, magnitudes, and frequencies"® and is, therefore,
difficult to pin down.
If this assertion is true— that corruption manifests
itself in many sizes and shapes, the questions are:

Would

such an ambiguous concept as corruption be understood in the
absence of a universal definition?

Would it be practical to

clearly define corruption without falling into conceptual
problems?

The answers to these questions are emphatically

"no". Given the manifestations and ramifications of
corruption, any endeavor to search for a cross-cultural
definition would indeed lead to conceptual traps and also
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invoke some serious ethnocentric labels.

Furthermore, it

would be unprecedented and insensitive for researchers to
use a Western notion to explain, analyze, and measure
corruption in Third World countries, specifically in SubSaharan Africa.

However, it would also be absolutely

impossible to study, operationalize, analyze, and understand
political corruption without some general consensus on what
constitutes corruption.
This chapter addresses five major questions:

(1) What

is corruption? (2) What is the difference between corruption
and political corruption? (3) What type of behavior
constitutes corruption? (4) How do Africans view/think about
corruption? and (5) What kinds of behavior do they regard as
corrupt?

But, before discussing what peoples of Africa

understand about corruption, it is important foremost to
explore the different definitions of corruption based on
legal and moral grounds, on public interest and public
opinion viewpoints, and on economic and classical
philosophy.
It is John G. Peters and Susan Welch's contention that
no matter what aspect of behavior or political system is
examined, the study of systemic or government corruption is
still hampered by the lack of an adequate definition.

For

example, what may be "corrupt" to one person or government
official, may just be

"normal behavior" to another.®
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Equally significant, the cliche "one man's meat is another
man's poison" or "one man's terrorist is to another a
liberator" may be worn-out, but together they nonetheless
illustrate how notoriously difficult it gets to define the
concept of corruption or to separate corrupt from non
corrupt behavior in a diversified world.
According to Arnold J. Heidenheimer, any analysis of
political corruption must confront the thorny issue of
defining what is meant by the term.^° Elaine R. Johansen
asserts that there has been a tremendous attempt to
catalogue and delineate the identifying characteristics of
political corruption, but to date no generally agreed upon
definition has been achieved."-

In contrast, however, Walter

Little and Eduardo Posada-Carbo contend that for all the
moral indignation corruption generates, political corruption
should be distinguished from crimes such as theft, burglary,
and embezzlement.

They maintain that while several forms of

corruption may well involve criminality, a definition that
is too "narrowly based on legal codes sacrifices
consideration of corruption's more subtle and nebulous
aspects".
For example, often political corruption is
characterized by dual and contradictory elements.

When

engaging in bribes and backhanders, political officials and
businesses may be fulfilling their legitimate functions.
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The bribe may be a byproduct of the fulfillment of an
official process, such as in the case of business licenses.
In other cases, such as the use of "sweeteners" (tax
incentives) by governments to attract investments in a given
region or industry, the distinction between such
inducements, which are claimed to be legitimate, and
bribery, which is seen as corrupt, is sometimes hazy.

Such

overlaps have led some analysts to distinguish between
black, white, and gray forms of corruption based on how
public opinion perceives t h e m . I t is evident, for example,
that members of

the United States congress in Washington

D.C. compete in a "rat-race" for pork-barrel projects for
their states/constituencies and lobby Congress to offer tax
incentives to businessmen investing in rundown inner-cities
and crime ridden neighborhoods. The question is:
behavior constitute corruption?

Does this

Put simply, under what

category of corrupt behavior would this practice of
logrolling fall?
Heidenheimer identifies three types of corruption—
Black, Gray, and White.

He labels an action

'Black corruption' which a majority consensus of both
elite and mass opinion would condemn and would want see
punished on grounds of principle. 'Grey corruption'
indicates that some element, usually elites, may want
to see the action punished, others not and majority may
well be ambiguous. 'White corruption' signifies that
the majority of both elite and mass opinion probably
would not vigorously support an attempt to punish a
form of corruption that they regard tolerable."
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It is quite likely that the behavior/actions of the U.S.
legislators who put their states' interests above those of
the country would fall under the category of grey
corruption.

LEGAL, PUBLIC INTEREST, PUBLIC OPINION,
ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL
What is corruption?

According to Ernest Harsch,

corruption includes all practices or behavior that society
identifies, labels, or condemns as being corrupt.

These

practices may include such activities as "outright theft,
embezzlement of funds or other appropriations of state
property, nepotism and the granting of favors to personal
acquaintances, and the abuse of public authority and
positions to exact payment and privileges"." Even with clear
and succinct behaviors and practices, evidently, explaining
corruption still remains notoriously complex.
Numerous observers define corruption in different ways
based on legality, public interest, public opinion, marketoriented principles, and philosophical viewpoints.
According to Stephen Ellis, corruption is "the use of
official position or authority for purposes of personal
advantages"." George Benson defines it as the "illegitimate
use of public power for private gain"."

H. A. Brasz, on the
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other hand, asserts that corruption is the "arbitrary use of
power".

For his part, Stanislav Andreski writes that

corruption "designates the practice of using the power of
office for making private gains in breach of laws and
regulations nominally in force".
M. McMullan states that "a public official is corrupt if
he accepts money or money's worth for doing something that
he is under a duty to do anyway or one that he is under a
duty not to do, or to exercise a legitimate discretion for
improper reasons".^® Joseph S. Nye defines corruption as
"behavior which deviates from the formal duties of public
role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding
(personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status
gains: or violates rules against the exercise of certain
types of private-regarding

influence"."^

In the same vein,

D.H. Bayley argues that corruption, while tied to the act of
bribery in a general term, covers the "misuse of authority
as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need
not be m o n e t a r y " . F o r example, Richard Nixon's Watergate
scandal and Ronald Reagan's Iran-Contra

Affairs serve as

backdrops to illustrate how United States presidents misused
their executive authority, not purely to enrich themselves,
but largely for other purposes— re-election in the case of
Nixon and power and popularity for Reagan.

In short, one

can argue that those individuals who orchestrated the
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Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals, including of course the
two presidents, may not have benefitted financially, but the
desire to see the Republican Party win election and stay in
power or control the government's course of action was
worthwhile.
Definitions of corruption based on the public interest
perspective are significant because they essentially broaden
the range of behavior considered corrupt.

For instance,

when a public officeholder accepts illegal rewards to give
favors to donors, he or she threatens and damages the public
interest and

violates the public trust.

According to

Arnold A. Rogow and H. D. Lasswell,
A corrupt act violates responsibility towards at least
one system of public or civic order and is, in fact,
incompatible with (destructive of) any such system. A
system of public or civic order exalts common interest
over special interest; violations of common interest
for special advantage are corrupt.^®
Equally important is the definition of corruption based
on public opinion that suggests that a political behavior is
corrupt when the weight of public opinion determines it so."
However, Peters and Welch assert that the conception of
political corruption harbors similar limitations like public
interest.

Whose opinion carries much weight?

Is it that of

the elites, the rich and powerful, or the masses— the poor
and powerless?

Indeed, the elites' opinions are often key

in almost all developed and developing countries.

But one
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cannot underestimate the power of the masses.
once said in his poem, DESIDERATA, the

As St. Paul

masses and "even the

dull and ignorant; they too have their story".’®
Nonetheless, Peters and Welch contend studies show that when
it comes to certain issues, public sentiment can be either
ambiguous or divided among the public and even among the
political elites in their assessment of appropriate
standards of public conduct.

Whatever the case maybe,

opinions of the elites often take precedent.
The market-oriented definition of corruption, on the
other, hand seeks to extrapolate corruption based purely on
economic theory.

Economist Susan Rose-Ackerman defines

corruption "as an allocative mechanism for scarce
resources"." In the same vein, Nathaniel Leff states that
"corruption is an extra-legal institution used by
individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of
the bureaucracy. As such, the existence of corruption per se
indicates only that these groups participate in the
decision-making process to a greater extent than would
otherwise be the case".-®
For his part, Jacob van Klaveren asserts:
Thus, we will conceive of corruption in terms of a
civil servant who regards his public office as a
business, the income of which he will, in the extreme
case, seek to maximize^ The office then becomes a
maximizing unit. The size of his income does not depend
on an ethical evaluation of his usefulness for the
common good but precisely upon the market situation and
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his talents for finding the point of maximal gain on
the public demand curve.■'
Also, Robert Tilman agrees that:
Corruption... involves a shift from a mandatory pricing
model to a free-marJcet model. The centralized
allocative mechanism, which is the ideal of modern
bureaucracy, may break down in the face of serious
disequilibrium between supply and demand. Clients may
decide that it is worthwhile toriskthe known
sanctions and pay the higher costsinorder
to be
assured of receiving the desired benefits. When this
happens, bureaucracy ceases to be patterned after the
mandatory market and takes on the characteristics of
the free market.^
Clearly, the economic approach or framework to corruption is
pertinent because it assists us in assessing the economic
impact of corruption in any given political system.
Finally, there is also the classical philosophical
explanation of "corruption of the body politic" as is
understood by Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Thucydides, Thomas
Hobbes, and Niccolo Machiavelli.

These theorists, in

particular, Niccolo Machiavelli, define corruption as:
The moral incapacity of citizens to make reasonably
disinterested commitments to actions, symbols and
institutions which benefit the substantive common
welfare. This extensive demise of loyalty to the
commonwealth comes from the interaction of human nature
with systematic inequality of wealth, power and status.
The corruption of the polity results in certain
identifiable patterns of political conflicts and
competition. The central feature of these patterns is
the emergence of quasi-governmental factions and an
increasingly polarized class system. The politics of
the factions leads to an undermining of the efficacy of
the basic political structures of the society and the
emergence of systematic corruption in all aspects of
political life.31
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In essence, these political theorists assert that
corruption involves all the evils of a society and
especially behavior that is immoral— injustice and
inequality, placing private interest over public interest,
and lack of virtue and justice that results in the moral
disorder of societies and the decay of political

s y s t e m s . 3-

Therefore, according to the definitions presented above
by different scholars, academicians, and theorists, it is
safe to say that all illegitimate or unethical uses of
government offices and public resources, misuse/abuse of
power for private or selfish motives— economic, social,
political, cultural, and ideological— at the expense of the
public, can be regarded as corrupt behavior or practices.
Indeed, no matter how one looks at corruption, its
characteristics or features are the same in both developed
and developing nations.

The only difference is how it is

practiced, how it is viewed, and what effects it has on a
society.
Padhy Krushna Singh argues that in developed nations,
specifically the United States, the possession of wealth was
for decades a common road for political power and influence.
In contrast, in developing countries, especially
contemporary Africa the reverse is true, i.e., politics has
become the sure path to wealth.^*

The misuse of public
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offices for personal enrichment has become the norm, not the
exception, in post-independence Africa.
It is clearly argued that most African elites seek
political offices not necessarily because they want to serve
the public, but purely because of the economic and personal
factors.

This is because political office/power more often

than not ensure automatic access to public or scarce
resources and provides immediate avenues to personal
enrichment.

For his part, Samuel P. Huntington contends

that when politics or political power is used for economic
reasons, i.e., to promote a few persons' selfish ends at the
expense of public good, "political values and institutions"^"
or ethics become secondary and this by itself constitutes
political corruption.
In distinguishing corruption from political corruption,
Peter DeLeon and Le Vine Victor state that the latter is a
"cooperative form of unsanctioned, usually condemned policy
influence for some type of significant personal gain, in
which the currency could be economic, social, political, or
ideological remuneration".V.O. Key, Jr., claims that
political corruption is an intentional act and neglecting to
perform one's political duties.
Singh argues that, political corruption is indeed
deliberate and intentional because political actors choose
to neglect to perform their political duties as is required
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of them and instead perform these duties only after
receiving bribes and kickbacks.

For example, a political

office is misused when business licenses, work permits,
government contracts, allocation of public projects, hiring
government employees, or providing

quotas and other favors

that stand to benefit a few to the highest bidder while
deliberately ignoring those who meet the necessary
qualifications or standards.

Therefore, political

corruption can assume different shapes and dimensions, quid
pro quo being the obvious.
Theodore J. Lowi, on the other hand, identifies two
types of political corruption.

The first is Big Corruption

(Big C) and the second is little corruption (little C).
While the former is "corruption that contributes to the
decomposition, dissolution, or disorientation of the
constitution", the latter "is corruption that reflects or
contributes to individual moral depravity". Lowi maintains
that Big C puts the state at risk while little C is the most
feared corruption of all, because it involves the public.
In addition, John A. Gardiner identifies three
categories of

political corruption.

The first is non

feasance (failing to perform a required duty at all); second
is malfeasance (the commission of some act which is
positively unlawful); and third is misfeasance (the improper
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performance of some act a person can properly do) 3Evidently, it is argued that most political leaders, the
elites, and top civil servants in sub-Saharan Africa are
guilty of all three types of political corruption.

THE INDIGENOUS DEFINITIONS OF CORRUPTION
Clearly, just as the concept of political corruption
is perceived and defined in various ways among Westerners,
the same thing applies to non-Westerners, particularly among
indigenous Africans.

Indeed, it is true among Africans that

behavior that usually benefits a few people "punishes" the
majority, causes havoc, leads to slicing foreign aid, civil
war, death, hunger, disease, tribalism, nepotism, genderism,
clientalism, dictatorship, unemployment, low living
standards, sin, etc. can be regarded as corrupt activities.
In 1994, Kenyan scholars conducted a study on political
corruption, entitled The Anatomy of Political Corruption:
Legal. Political and Socio-Economic Perspectives.

In their

inquiry, they asked the Kenyan public "What comes
immediately in your mind when the word corruption is
mentioned?"

The following is a list of responses:

Money, government officers, unfair deals, theft,
bribery, tribalism, Kenya police, underpaid staff, use
of position to get rich, evil, mismanagement of funds,
bad feeling, Indians, rich get richer, denial of one's
rights, fear, injustice, TKK (Toa Kitu Kidogo— give out
something small), civil war, no development, annoyed,
irresponsibility, dishonesty, helplessness.
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discrimination, oppression, no money nothing happens,
unsatisfied human rights, rotten society, surprised,
easy way out, damaging, unorthodox ways, unlawful ways,
favoritism, financial experts, malpractice,
destruction, disagreement, Kamlesh Pattni, immorality,
fraud, deprivation, government not managing economy and
resources, political instability, illegal, suffering,
cheating, sinful, unfaithful, and indecency.
The above responses, although exclusively applying to
Kenya, are, however, inclusively applicable in part across
the African continent and especially within many countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa.

These responses show that the public

attaches many things to the concept of corruption.

In fact,

it is not uncommon to find most Africans equating corruption
to leaders like Mobutu Sese Seko, General. Sani Abacha,
Daniel arap Moi, Paul Biya, Omar Bongo, Charles Taylor,
Yoweri Museveni, and former dictators such as Marshall Idi
Amin Dada, Jean Bokasa, Babangida, or Pik Botha of South
Africa during apartheid, and even to certain tribes— Kikuyu,
Kalenjin, Zulu, Xhosa, Asmaran, Yoruba, Igbo, Gbandolite,
and even to some foreigners— the British, French,
Portuguese, Italian, Germans, Belgians (the former colonial
masters) or to the indigenous Indian populations and even
Americans.

Depending on which group of people the question

about corruption is directed/addressed to, there are as many
and different response as there are peoples and tribes.
However, as Kivutha Kibwana et al assert, the response^
can be categorized in a number of ways:

those that identify
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various perpetrators of corrupt activities in the form of
institutions, departments, professions and individuals;
those that identify specific aspects perceived as smacking
of corruption— destruction, suffering etc.; and those that
are a reflection of public outrage and desperation generated
by the impact of corruption.

These can be described as

attitudinal definitions.

A WORKING DEFINITION OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
Surely, there is no clear-cut definition as to what
political corruption means, nor can one single definition
based on legality, public interest, public opinion,
economics, and philosophy pin down the concept of
corruption.

But for the purpose of this study, I define

political corruption as the use of political power and
office in ways that are geared to some individual or
collective self-interest that are illegal and/or considered
corrupt, improper, or self-serving.

Perhaps Syed Hussein

Alatas' inclusive and comprehensive characteristics of what
constitute corrupt acts sum it up well when he concludes
that they include,
A betrayal of trust; deception of a public body,
private institution or society at large; deliberate
subordination of common interests to specific
interests; secrecy of execution except in situations
which allow powerful individuals or those under their
protection to dispense with it; involvement of more
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than one person or party; the presence of mutual
obligations and benefits in pecuniary or other forms ;
the focusing of actions on those who want definite
decisions and those who can influence them; the attempt
to camouflage the corrupt act by form of lawful
justification; and the expression of a contradictory
dual function by the committing of the act.'"‘
Alatas goes on to typologize corruption in seven
distinct types— transactive, extortive, defensive,
investive, nepotistic, autogenic, and supportive.

He

writes :
The transactive type refers to the mutual arrangement
between the donor and the recipient to the advantage of
an activity pursued by both parties. This normally
involves business and government, or the public and
government. The extortive type is the kind where the
donor is compelled to bribe in order to avoid harm
being inflicted upon his person, his interest, or upon
those persons or things dear to him, defensive
corruption in the behavior of the victim of extortive
corruption. His corruption is in self-defense.
Investive corruption involves the offer of goods or
services without any direct link to a particular favor,
but in anticipation of future occasions when the favor
will be required. Nepotistic corruption, or nepotism,
is the unjustified appointment or other forms,
violating the norms and rules of the undertaking.
Autogenic corruption is a form involving only the
person himself, e.g., where a person makes fraudulent
claims with everything properly accounted for.
Supportive corruption does not directly involve money
or any other immediate returns, but describes corrupt
action undertaken to protect and strengthen the
existing corruption.*3
Perhaps Alatas' above schema offers a clear definition
of corruption that is neither rule-bound nor tied to a
society's prevailing moral conventions or n o r m s , b u t rather
provides the most comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon.
In an African context, therefore, it is clear that what has

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

been offered as corruption is an all-pervasive syndrome that
resembles one or all of the forms discussed above.
Corruption is an act or omission perpetuated by an
individual or group of individuals which goes against the
legitimate expectations and hence the interests of society.
Such acts or omissions are not confined to the holders of
public office.45
Indeed, corruption takes place in all spheres of human
endeavor— in government offices, corporate organizations,
private institutions, and daily lives.

Political corruption

can be both small- and big-scale, primitive or
sophisticated.

In contemporary Africa, this phenomenon has

become a way of life, a common culture, or a continent-wide
characteristic.

This disease continues to have a strong

grip in almost every African society and eats into its very
fabric.

As Kibwana et al argue, when corruption becomes a

cancerous disease, the whole society is encapsulated and
then holds the social fabric in

ransom.

4° It is with this

holistic context— Western and non-Western— that I define and
discuss political corruption.

CORRUPTION AND VERSUS POLITICAL CORRUPTION
But to distinguish further the concept of corruption
and political corruption, it is imperative to turn to the
differences between these two concepts.

Although outwardly
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the two appear to be synonymous, corruption is more
comprehensive, having wider and broader connotations and
ramifications.

As discussed above, corruption involves all

misuse of public office for selfish motives at the expense
of the general public.

For example, civil servants who use

their office power to obtain extra income from the public
are involved in corruption.4® Corruption, therefore, is the
perversion of power, the violation of civic order, a breach
of trust, an illegal behavior that exalts private interests
over public interest.4® It can be either administratively,
socially, or judicially-oriented, or business and political
in nature.5°
Political corruption, on the other hand, is a narrower
term and refers mainly to the abuse of power by political
actors seeking to promote their own ends— enrichment.
an

It is

illegitimate way of using political power for securing

pecuniary or other advantages directly or indirectly either
for oneself or for those in whom one is interested.

Put

simply, it is a trade of public interest for private gain. 5"To put this into perspective, if a political leader, a
parliamentarian, a judge, a military general/admiral, or a
mayor uses his or her political authority to benefit or
enrich himself or herself or family, clan, or tribe without
regard to others or in breach of a contract/trust, then this
is referred to as political corruption.

Unfortunately, this
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tends to be the trend in almost all sub-Saharan African
nations.

Throughout Africa political leaders or elites are

first and foremost interested in lining their pockets at the
expense of the public.

In addition, African leaders are,

above all, loyal to their respective constituencies and most
of all tend to serve their tribes first before service to
the public or country.

Most of their daily undertakings and

decision-making is influenced by special ethnic interests.
They demand bribes or kickbacks for their duties and often
times the highest bidder gets the government's scarce goods
and services, including government contracts.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION VERSUS BRIBERY
While political corruption is an inducement to commit a
violation of duty

bribery, on the other hand, is a price,

reward, gift, or favor bestowed or promised with a view to
pervert the judgment or corrupt the conduct especially of a
person in a position of trust.5® Bribery whose currency is
money, often sways and influences the judgment or decisions
of the receiver or bribe taker— a political actor, judge,
legislator, civil servant, voter, or witness.

This kind of

betrayal of trust is what V. 0. Key. Jr., calls a cold
blooded commercial transaction.
John Noonan, Jr., on the other hand argues that bribes
are ancient, universal and may arise from larger concepts of
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reciprocity or the practice of gift-giving.

Under this

condition, the definition of a bribe would very much depend
upon cultural understanding, that is, how people of a
particular culture view bribes, and what criterion they use
to distinguish bribes from genuine gifts.

Bribes can be

overt or covert in nature and can be disguised as businesses
or loans.

Additionally, they can be treated as voluntary

gifts offered in good will or "soft" tokens/monies.
Whatever the case may be, bribes are associated with the
practice of quid pro quo (you scratch my back, and I scratch
yours) .5®
In contrast, Daniel H. Lowenstern contends that
equating

bribes with quid pro quo is being unrealistic.

He

states that bribes take many shapes and come in different
sizes when associated with political corruption.

He defines

bribery as "an explicit exchange of a specific benefit for a
specific official action (or inaction)".5® He maintains that
bribes are an exchange of "anything of value", e.g.,
campaign contribution, endorsement, agreement not to run,
logrolling, and kickbacks.

He concludes that

"...distinguishing of bribes from non-bribes requires the
application of more general standards distinguishing corrupt
official conduct from proper conduct".
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In Africa, bribes are viewed as another source of
supplementing meager government wages.

Among the public,

bribe-giving is the only sure avenue to acquire scarce
government goods and services, i.e., business licenses,
jobs, passports, scholarships, housing, farming equipment,
and government contracts/projects. Wahome Mutahi states
that, if there are bribes to be paid to get to heaven,
Kenyans will bribe St. Paul at the gate to jump the queue.
Everywhere in Africa, without a "handshake", many things may
be unreachable and unattainable.

The implication from this

argument is that in Africa, bribery and corruption rule the
day and are seen as politically correct.
By no means, however, is political corruption
synonymous with bribery.

The two concepts are intimately

linked together, but they are not inseparable.

The latter

is narrower, more direct, and less s u b t l e . F o r instance, a
person bribed is a person corrupted, but a person may be
corrupt without taking recourse to bribery.

In fact,

political corruption can and does take place without even a
tendency for personal gain.

For example, the Watergate

scandal— the criminal act of breaking into the Democratic
headquarters during Richard Nixon's presidency—

was not

necessarily engineered for personal/monetary gain, but the
need for the re-election of a Republican president for a
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second term drove the Republican "Neanderthals" (the strong
men) into committing this crime.
Furthermore, a person having an interest in a certain
corporation may approach a parliamentarian and lure him to
vote on a matter that may clearly be harmful to the public
interest but beneficial to the corporation.

If the bargain

is accomplished, then this is unmistakably a case of bribery
and the actions involved are also political corruption.®® In
the same vein, if a parliamentarian uses his political power
to demand bribes prior to voting for a certain bill, he is
clearly disregarding his public duty for the sake of
personal reasons.

Under this circumstance, that

parliamentarian or government official is involved in both
bribery and political corruption.

The term "auto

corruption" clearly distinguishes political corruption from
bribery.

Therefore, political corruption, in the widest

sense of the word, includes both "bribery and auto
corrupt ion "®"- and may be defined as an intentional
misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty or
unwarranted exercise of power with the motive of gaining
some advantage more or less directly personal.®^

BRIBERY VERSUS GIFT-GIVING
The concepts of bribes and gifts are used somewhat
separately and differently in the Western countries.
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non-Western nations, especially African, the two are used
indistinguishably because, for decades, the former was
absent in the vocabulary.

Generally speaking, this is a

true national epic in Africa that can be traced back for
centuries.

Even social scientists, especially

anthropologists who study non-Western societies, Africa
included, prefer not to use the term "bribe", especially in
those "primitive" societies in which offerings to the gods
are a common practice or where the exchange of gifts among
people— families, clans, or tribes— is viewed as an
obligation that symbolizes gratitude, friendship,
generosity, and reciprocity.
Thus anthropologists refrain from applying the modern
concept judgmentally for to do so would be ethnocentric and
violate their sense of cultural relativism.in fact, even
the famous anthropologist, Marcel Mauss, in his book. The
Gift. does not use the term "bribe" but instead calls all
exchanges "gifts".®4

Indeed, African societies strongly

regard the practice of exchanging gifts in high esteem.
They also view the practice of giving gifts to others as an
unspoken obligation that is continuous in time of peace or
turmoil, in health or sickness, in wealth or in poverty.
Marjorie Shostak states that among the primitive !Kung
San— hunters and gathers in Africa, "giving gifts is a
fairly formal affair or practice, and people remember
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clearly who gave what to whom when".®® The !Kung San are
undoubtedly fond of exchanging gifts because it is a
reciprocal practice that is passed on to succeeding
generations. Although the !Kung San are the only group that
practice hunting and gathering for survival, the practice of
gift-giving is nonetheless a continent-wide phenomenon that
is also practiced by almost all African societies.
The cultural importance of reciprocal giving is not
limited

to Africa.

Marcel Mauss reported similar practices

among cultures in Melanesia, North America, and South
America.

He states that :

What they exchange is not exclusively goods and wealth,
real and personal property, and things of economic
value. They exchange rather courtesies, entertainment,
ritual, military assistance, women, children, dances,
and feasts.. ..®®
Although these presentations and counter-presentations
takes place under a voluntary guise, they are nonetheless
strictly obligatory, and failure to comply often leads to
open warfare or conflict.
In Africa, gifts are not necessarily equivalent to
bribes.

Gift-giving is a normal practice that dates back

many years and has a strong symbolic meaning— a sign of
respect to the elders, especially the chief; a token of
generosity and service to others, especially those in need;
and a gesture of friendship, "I come not for war, but for
peace".

However, this practice began to be abused, misused.
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and exploited with the introduction of monetary currencies
that replaced the long tradition of barter trade. Also,
because it is easy to demand bribes in terms of money, it is
difficult to detect or identify bribe-givers and bribe
takers .
The practice of offering gifts has been misconstrued or
misinterpreted to mean bribes.
is a Western perception.

Undoubtedly, this labeling

Surely, Christopher Clapham argues

that, whereas a Westerner may regard the practice of giftgiving as outright bribery, an African may see as genuine
the exchange of gifts as a normal lifestyle and a
continuation of traditional practice.®^

He maintains that

corruption makes no sense because there is no clear
distinction between gifts and bribery.
and bribes (corruption) start?

Where do gifts end

Pertaining to political

leaders, he writes, "There is no embezzlement because the
ruler's personal income is the same as the government
revenue, no nepotism because there is no criterion for
appointment to office apart from the ruler's favor".®®
It is Tahar Ben Jelloun's assertion that most African
leaders and civil servants take part in corruption, not
because they think it is illegal, but what Westerners may
define as corruption or bribery, Africans view as only a
subtle way of recouping what is theirs.

Others think that

without "cutting corners" (accepting bribes), it is
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extremely hard to be better off if one is honest.
Additionally, some argue that "saints or heroes" are never
rewarded, but "flexible" officers are those who see their
opportunities and take them and create the need to be sought
after by the public for "connections" (favors)
Contrary to Clapham and Jelloun, there is a general
consensus among indigenous African societies that excessive
demand for "gifts" (bribes), especially for free government
services, constitutes corruption.

Additionally, excessive

practice of extortion by government officials for baksheesh
or dash or kitu kidogo (something small) or "speed money"
for state goods and services and other favors is seen as
daylight bribery and corruption, although some accept them
in the guise of gifts— a sign of gratitude.
In Africa, being overly selfish, greedy, tribalistic,
nepotistic, or for that matter giving favors to friends,
relatives, and tribesmen in terms of government contracts,
jobs, promotions, loans, and business licenses purely on an
ascriptive basis rather than on merit, i.e., those with
qualifications, education, experience, skills or expertise,
is definitely considered as Magendo. illicit, and corruption
Indeed, this practice is quite common in almost all African
countries.
Similarly, the practice of using public office and/or
economic or social status to influence decision-making in
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parliament or other institutions of decision-making for the
sake of creating opportunities for one's constituency, i.e.,
region or province, and to implement strategies that would
generate/bring better living conditions, infrastructure,
schools, hospitals, sanitation systems, and housing or for
that matter the economic, social, and political development
at the expense of others is regarded as illegal behavior
that constitutes corruption.
Furthermore, blatant imbalance in the distribution of
offices, privileges, goods, and services among tribal
groupings is seen as c or r u p t i o n . T h e fact that the ruling
tribe often times takes all, controls all, and has all
explains why there is high-scale corruption to win favors
from those tribes in power or to penetrate roadblocks to
resources and power.

In short, corruption in Africa

includes all kinds of practices, legal or illegal, that
stand to benefit only a few individuals, clans, or tribes
who are strategically, economically, and politically
positioned within government institutions and agencies,
especially within the parastatals— government owned

and/or

subsidized agencies— Kenya Airways (KQ), Kenya Railways
Corporation (KTC), Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA),
and Kenya Power and Light Corporation (KPLC) to name a few.
But in Africa, like other Third World regions, where
people are used to the practice of looking for "connections"
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(middlemen or go-betweens) for scarce goods and services and
favors, it would be foolishness to do otherwise; where it is
normal conduct to do business behind dirty corridors
covertly or clandestinely, it would be foolish to do
otherwise; where government officers can get rich and be
poverty free, "taxing" patients, clients, or the public is
the only way out; where the public is willing to grease the
palm of officers to jump queues or acquire a favor, it would
be unreasonable to not follow suit or it would be suicidal
to do otherwise.
Throughout Africa, due to the severe problems of
poverty, hunger, drought, famine, population explosion, and
scarcity of natural resources (in many areas), being
"flexible" or "adapting" to a given situation is an
essential key to survival.

The public for their part looks

for someone to intervene in order to pick up a document from
a government office.

In this sense, some officers tend to

think that it is reasonable to be "paid" below the tables or
be bribed for rendering their duties and services to the
public.

Others also justify these illicit activities as a

way of contributing to a climate of "national solidarity.""'^
According to Jelloun, "corruption is a supplementary tax in
disguise. Everyone goes along with it.... ""'3 Indeed, Jelloun
asserts that "Poverty is not always a good adviser. It
pushes people to break the law, steal, swindle, and lie"
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It is true among Africans that if it does not "rain"
people will fight and starve because the bluer the sky, the
emptier the pockets."'®

This implies that when it rains, the

farmer's crops germinate, he is paid, and may require
farming equipment, fertilizer, or a loan from the
government.

But before acquiring his needs, he will "pay"

(bribe) government officers for their services and in the
end everyone is happy.
A senior government officer advising a junior has this
to say:
The cost of living is going up. There is nothing we can
do about it. You have to adapt. Everyone knows that
most salaries are symbolic. The state knows it, just as
it knows that people have ways to compensate for what
they lack. It closes its eyes. It has to, otherwise
there would be a revolution. Citizens participate in
whatever ways that are available to them to fill the
gap. It's normal practice. It's a national consensus, a
balancing mechanism. The whole trick is to do it
discreetly, even elegantly if possible.^®
In the African idiom, corruption is also equated with
being "fat", implying that "fat" people extract from the
"thin" people to maintain their rotund stomachs.

Indeed, in

walking through the corridors and government offices, one
can quickly detect and discern the "fat cats" by their wellnourished bellies, while the bone-thin masses queue in the
hallways of government offices waiting indefinitely to be
provided with government goods and services— birth
certificates, licenses, passports, farming equipment.
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identification cards, permits, employment benefits, water,
electricity, housing, loans, social security, medical
treatment, and registration of businesses to name a few.
The fact of the matter is that, only those who are able to
grease the palms of the government officials and the civil
servants expect to receive these services.
Perhaps the story of a fat and a thin man that is often
repeated throughout Africa during hunger, famine, and
starvation is worth mentioning:
'You should be ashamed of yourself', said the fat man
to the thin man. 'If a foreigner saw you before he saw
anyone else he would think there was a famine here'.
'And if he saw you next', replied the thin man, he
would know the reason for famine'.^®
In sum, according to Africans, corruption is, therefore,
"eating" too much from one's office or job; it is skimming
and "taxing" or extorting too much from the poor public; it
is skimming from government institutions and foreign aid
assistance; it is being too greedy and too "fat"; it is an
act of demanding money behind dirty corridors, bars, and
streets; it is the refusal to accept traditional gifts— a
goat, beads, a basket full of corn flour, a hand-made rug or
other things that are valuable, but without monetary value;
it is also refusing to accept small bribes for a roasted leg
of goat meat, a couple of beers and brandies holding out for
more as some usually do.

Worse still, government officers
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are regarded as corrupt if they fail to deliver the promised
services or favors after receiving bribes.
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CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HISTORICAL SURVEY
"Old and corrupted nations cannot be governed
On the same principles with those [young nations]
Which are simple and virtuous".
— Napoleon I (1769-1821)
"In corrupt Governments the Place is given for
the sake of the Man; in good ones the Man is
chosen for the sake of the Place".
— George Savile (1633-1695)
"Corruption is like the garbage.
It has to be removed daily".
— Ignacio Pichardo Paraza,
Controller-General of Mexico (1987)
For decades, the existence of government corruption
has been regarded as a "normal" practice in almost all
political systems and societies.^

As Samuel Huntington

asserts, corruption is highly likely to be found in all
bureaucratic institutions in all periods of political
development, although the degree and magnitude varies
significantly among societies.

Corruption is "obviously

more common in some societies than others and more common in
some time in the evolution of a society than at other
times".2
Obviously, there is prima facie evidence that attests to
the fact that corruption was at one time or another
widespread in the Western world in ancient, medieval, and
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mod em periods.

For instance, corruption was more common in

Great Britain in the 18th century than in the 17th and 20th
centuries. The practice was also more common in the United
States in the 19th century than in the 18th and 20th
centuries.

Basically, during the Industrial Revolution,

higher patterns of corrupt behavior were reported in Western
industrialized nations, especially Great Britain and the
United States.^
Historically, corruption was a normal practice in
Oriental and Occidental societies during ancient and
medieval periods.*

Furthermore, in many Asian, Middle

Eastern, and African countries, corruption was a common
practice.

Debates that suggest that during early periods of

history mankind was pure and incorrupt is a travesty, much
like sweeping dirt under the rug.

To assert that

precolonial African societies were completely untainted by
corrupt behavior would be simply untrue.

CORRUPTION IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
For example, in ancient Egyptian, Babylonian and Hebrew
societies judges received bribes while performing their
required public duties.^

Conversely, from the Biblical point

of view, one finds out that Eli's sons used their priesthood
powers to demand or extort sacrifices from the people— much
more than was required.®

Similarly, in the Old Testament,
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the prophet Amos denounced the rule of King Jeroboam II for
receiving bribes.'

In the same vein, the book of Exodus

condemned bribery and other social injustices: "Beware of
accepting bribes; it blinds even the prudent, and destroys
the judgment even of just men".® Prophet Isaiah of the Old
Testament described the man who will be saved from the
horror of destruction as one who refuses ill-gotten gains
and bribes.® The list is endless.
Clearly, one can argue that there is no place in the
world that has not experienced some form of corrupt behavior
that can easily be interpreted to mean corruption.

Not even

Greece, the land of the philosopher kings, was totally free
from this scourge.

CORRUPTION IN GREECE AND ROME
Although corruption and bribery had a rather slow
growth in ancient Greece, by early 6th century B.C.
corruption had become a common feature in the political life
of the Greeks.

The growth of corruption in Greece during

this century was attributed to an increase in economic
activity and to political apathy.

However, as windows of

opportunity arose, political participation, bribery, and
corruption steadily increased as Greeks struggled to capture
public offices.^®
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According to Aristotle, it was at this time that
organized bribing of judges and public officials commenced."
Because corruption was linked to political change and
democracy or revolution, it attracted considerable attention
among the Greeks.

Even though corruption became the means

for political advancement, it was nonetheless condemned and
rejected by many Greek philosophers such as Aristotle and
Plato.

In his book The Laws. Plato stated that:

The servants of the nation are to render their services
without any taking of presents.... To form your judgment
and then abide by it is no easy task, and 'tis a man's
surest course to give loyal obedience to the law which
commands, 'Do no service for a present
Therefore, Plato extols just and virtuous persons
(philosopher kings) while condemning sycophants and corrupt
tyrants.

Clearly, there were all forms of corrupt practice

in the history of Greece.
In the ancient Roman Empire, on the other hand, lowscale corrupt practices were also prevalent in the public
sector.

Public servants often received bribes for providing

services to citizens.

Later, bribery and corruption were

commonly practiced on a grand-scale during elections for
public positions in the legislature and judiciary.^ As Syed
Hussein Alatas states, the intensity and variety of
corruption was probably greater in Rome than Greece simply
because of the possession of an Empire.

During the first

three decades of the second century B.C. Rome underwent a
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series of economic, political, social, and agricultural
changes.

These changes led to a rapid increase of wealth,

especially among the state and military echelons.^*
Additionally, the growth in industry, commerce, and
urbanization in ancient Rome gradually gave way to modern
Rome and a rich class of people and new groups of wealthy
capitalists who slowly rose to ascendancy.^"

As Romans rose

with the spoils of their victories throughout Europe,
corruption and bribery became new adventures although not
"entirely open and shameless".
As Carl J. Friedrich points out, in Rome the presence
and prevalence of wide-scale corruption seemed to have a
"consequence of an unwieldly electoral system which derived
from history".

Clearly, as the Roman Empire expanded its

territories through conquest, electoral competition and
corruption increased.

During this period, corruption in

Rome was a result of people seeking public office for bread
and butter, or better still "the loaves and fishes of high
offices".
As a matter of fact, bribery in the electoral system did
not decline in ancient Rome or during the era of the
emperor, but it continued to increase throughout the Roman
Republic.

During this time, corruption was, however,

condemned by some members of the republican government and
by persons such as Cicero who were interested in reforming
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the degenerate republic by attempting to unearth and bring
extreme cases of corruption to trial."
However, these attempts were often unsuccessful because
the

Roman republic as a whole had became so polluted with

immoral practices that corrupt behavior became a norm.
During medieval times, corruption manifested itself in Rome
in the form of bribery and extortion by local and state
officials who perverted justice.

For instance, those who

served kings and barons became the instruments for
collecting illegal money.Efforts to regulate trade and
commerce based upon the rule of law and principles
unfortunately led to well-developed mechanisms for
smuggling, which resulted in official corruption.^"
The moral decay/disintegration of the body politic in
Greece and Rome were the consequences of corruption,
injustice, inequality, and egoistic forces.

The prevalence

of these societal ills forced political philosophers such as
Thucydides, Aristotle, Plato, and Machiavelli to condemn
them.

These theorists opted to create ideal polities that

were just and ruled by virtuous persons for the sake of the
commonweal.
Niccolo Machiavelli, opted to provide a recipe to The
Prince as to how to reform both man and public institutions
to enhance civic culture and restore political order.

After

deeply and extensively studying the concept of corruption in
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Italy's political and social life, Machiavelli concluded
that corruption was a disease that destroyed the prosperity
of Italy's body politic."*

In essence, the social and

political decay, public immorality, and political disorder
were phenomena that most political theorists such as
Aristotle, Plato, Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and
Niccolo Machiavelli constantly confronted in their writings
and thus suggested that, virtue, justice, and the public
good ought to be the ultimate teleos of all polities.^
Indeed, "standing on the shoulders of giants" of these
philosophers, one can successfully construct a "theoretical
account of the decay of a political order"^® in today's
developed and developing countries and benefit from their
uniform understanding of politics, corruption, and how to
prevent it.

Although these theorists differ on many

occasions on certain concepts, they generally agree that any
polity that portrays characteristics of moral decay,
injustice, extensive inequality in wealth, power, and
status, abuse of public office for personal reasons,
betrayal of public trust, and the lack of civic culture and
virtue is by and large a corrupt state.
In sum, although political life today tries to operate
upon relatively high moral principles, bribery and
corruption in electoral processes, mudslinging, and other
abuses are nonetheless common and evident in many societies.
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Unmistakably, two centuries ago Great Britain was a "sink
hole" of corruption in all spheres of its political
structure— civil service, police, judiciary and legislative,
both within the monarchic and parliamentary systems."^ In the
same vein, ethnic corruption and political machines and
patronage were devastating to the United States in the 19th
century in major cities, particularly

New York and Chicago.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AMERICA
Perhaps the best example is that of George Washington
Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, who coined the phrase "honest
graft".

In his famous passage, Plunkitt said:

There's honest graft, and I'm an example of how it
works. I might sum up the whole thing by sayin': I seen
my opportunities and I took 'em'. Just let me explain
by example. My party's in power in the city and it's
goin' to undertake a lot of public improvements. Well,
I'm tipped off, say, that they are going to lay out a
new park at a certain place. I see my opportunity and I
take it. I go to that place and I buy up all the land I
can in the neighborhood. Then the board of this or that
makes its plan public and there is a rush to get that
land which nobody cared particular for before. Ain't it
perfectly honest to charge a good profit and make a
profit on my investment and foresight? Of course it is.
Well, that's honest graft.
No doubt, "corruption in high offices is not unique"®® in
the American political structure.

According to Martin

Gross, it is rife "from the smallest communities to the West
Wing of the White House, whichever party occupies it".®^ One
of the most celebrated episodes of corruption in high office
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involved a vice president of the United State, Spiro T.
Agnew.

Former Governor of Maryland, he was elected on the

Richard Nixon ticket in 1968 and again in 1972.

As a county

executive in Baltimore, he received up to one thousand
dollars a week on kickbacks from contractors, architects,
and engineers.

He continued this practice as governor and

finally as the U.S.

Vice President. It began when Agnew

received a friendly payment/donation of $50,000 to secure
government contract

a

for the donors. At first he denied the

charge but during the federal grandjury, he pleaded nolo
contendere (no contest) to the charge of evading income tax
on the tainted money.

In October 1973 he resigned as vice

president just before the Watergate break-in.®®
Another heinously corrupt scandal was that of Housing and
Urban Development HUD in the 1980s which showed that the
agency was riddled with influence peddling and special deals
that cost the taxpayers millions of dollars.

The House

investigative committee reported that "HUD was enveloped by
influence peddling, favoritism, abuse, greed, fraud,
embezzlement, and theft. In many housing programs, objective
criteria gave way to political preference and cronyism, and
favoritism supplanted fairness".

The committee concluded

that the "rehabilitation program which was intended for the
poor, became a cash cow which was milked by former HUD
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officials and the politically well-connected".®® Luckily,
most of the officials involved in this scandal were
prosecuted and sentenced.
In Chicago, during the era of political machines,
election fraud was also reported throughout the state
whereby dead men and women were voting on local and state
levels.

During this period, there were reports that local,

state, and national officials were accepting bribes and
kickbacks and/or taking part in government fraud and
embezzlement.
bottom up.

According to Gross, the practice was from the

In fact, local officials would take bribes for

such simple favors as zoning changes, assessments, and city
contracts.

At the top levels, crooked politicians or

legislators took part in lining their pockets first before
those of their constituents.

For most of these politicians

the motto is "once bought they remain bought" or as one U.S.
Congressman calls them "bastards who stay bought".®*
In New York, the tradition of graft was established in
the 19th century with Tammany Hall— the crooked Democratic
machine. It continued almost unabated well into the 1930s
and 1980s.

It is Gross's assertion that, "Corruption in New

York flourished in the post war years, with new twists in
the old scenario".®® For example, in the 1980s, Donald
Mannes, the Democratic boss in Queens County was implicated
in an extortion-bribery scheme in the city's Parking
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Violation Bureau (PVB) where millions of dollars were
missing.

Before he could be charged, he resigned and later

committed suicide.

The deputy director of the PVB, Geoffrey

G. Lindenauer, admitted to extorting up to $140,000 in
bribes from contractors and sharing it with other officials,
including Donald Mannes.

Fortunately, Lindenauer was

prosecuted and sentenced with others for bribery and fixing
parking tickets in New York.®® The list is endless.

Recent

cases of political corruption involve Whitewater, that
implicates the President of the United States Bill Clinton,
and the 1996 dirty money or illegal campaign contribution
funds that implicate both Democratic and Republican parties
and their leaders.
In conclusion, it is important to acknowledge that
sophisticated corruption is still a big problem in the U.S.
"Lest it be presumed that the United States is an oasis of
moral purity in a desert of worldwide corruption".®®'

Nathan

Miller reminds us that "...from Jamestown to Watergate,
corruption runs through our history like a scarlet thread.
Although we self-righteously congratulate ourselves on our
high moral standards, the grafting politicians, corrupt
tycoons, and crooked labor barons are prominent fixtures in
American folklore".®*
Perhaps Robert Klitgaard sums it up best when he
eloquently states that:
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Corruption is not the province of one particular
culture or region. Not many years ago, corruption
flourished in countries we now call 'developed*— and,
indeed, there is evidence that some forms of corrupt
behavior are today on the rise in most economically and
politically 'advanced' nations.®®
Evidence of scandals and fraud have been extensively
reported in Great Britain, Italy, France, Japan, and the
United States.

In America, episodes such as Watergate,

Iran-Contra, Whitewater, and illegal campaign funds top the
list of endless government political scandals.
Nevertheless, Klitgaard claims that "the situation is
particularly worrisome in 'developing' nations"*® because
they are most vulnerable to government/bureaucratic
corruption.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Political corruption is also a pervasive feature in the
Middle East.

David M. Miller and Clark D. Moore state that,

for centuries, the Ottoman Empire's misrule enhanced the
habits of corruption in the Islamic World.*® Consequently,
the payment of bribes (baksheesh) in the Arabic and Turkish
speaking countries and roshveh in Iran are deeply embedded
in the social and cultural fabric of these countries,
asserts Fernand Braudel.*® From Iraq to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
to Jordan, the prevalence of political payments in the
Middle East is derived from the historical presence of the
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all-powerful states.

Manfred Halpern claims that,

typically, governments have been the major source and owners
of capital, i.e., land, natural resources (particularly
oil), the primary dispensers of contracts, and the arbiters
of the rules of trade and investment.

State ownership of,

and control over, much of the means of production have been
an essential part of Middle Eastern economics.*®
Unlike Europe or the United States, the Middle East did
not produce a politically and economically influential
bourgeoisie or middle class that could act as a
countervailing power to the state and its rulers.**
French philosopher, Fernand Braudel states that,
paradoxically, the political payment was an accepted method
by which the tyranny of the ruler and venality of his
officials were curbed.*®

Halpern concludes that, because

today the Middle East is the world's foremost oil-producing
region, it is not uncommon to find government
inefficiencies, mismanagement, and tolerance of corruption
and bribery for those who must deal with Middle Eastern
political leaders, bureaucrats, and civil servants.

Indeed,

corruption is prevalent not only among government employees
but also among the businessmen who have to bribe royal
family members for contracts or other concessions to do
business.*®

Therefore, from Jordan to Iran, Palestine to

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia to Kuwait, and Iraq to Israel, the
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practice of giving gifts or bribes to acquire favors is a
common norm.

But like anywhere else in developing nations,

gifts today carry a negative connotation— bribery and
corruption.
Perhaps the worst affected region in Africa is subSaharan Africa.

The fact is that corruption is a problem

that Africans face daily can neither be "blithely ignored or
treated as a minor social malaise".*^ But before discussing
the problem of corruption in Africa, it is important to
trace the genesis of political corruption from pre-colonial
and colonial to post-colonial Africa.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Then our people lived peacefully, under the democratic
rule of their kings....Then the country was ours, in
our name and right....All men were free and equal and
this was the foundation of government. The council
[of elders] was completely democratic that all members
of the tribe could participate in its deliberations.
Chiefs and subjects, warriors and medicine men, all
took part and endeavored to influence its decisions.
— Nelson Mandela, 1984.
In pre-colonial Africa, the organizational structure of
the indigenous political system was generally based on
kinship and ancestry.

The survival of the tribe was the

primary objective of the African people.

Each ethnic group

had its own system of government that was ruled by custom
and tradition.

Written constitutions were non-existent.*®
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Many groupings that existed as separate political
entities were ruled by kings or chiefs.

Ethnic groups that

were under the rule of chiefs were referred to as chiefdoms
and were generally independent and autonomous.

For example,

the Asante and Zande of West Africa and the Zulu of South
Africa fall under this category.

Those tribes or

ethnicities that did not have chiefs or kings, on the other
hand, were referred to as stateless tribes and were easy
prey for conquerors who assimilated conquered areas into
empires.

This was evident among the Mandika, Fulani, Hausa,

and the Islamic empires in West Africa in the 18th and 19th
centuries.

Generally, in all African tribes, political

organizations began at lineage or village levels and
expanded into the tribes, chiefdoms, kingdoms, and state
settings.*®
Robert Williams observes that lineage was the most
powerful and effective means for unity and stability in
early Africa.®® Each lineage had its head elected according
to its own rules.

The Fante of Ghana used wealth as the

criterion while other lineages in West, Central, East, and
Southern African communities used personality cult and
characteristics such as age, maturity, relations to
ancestors, social status— many wives and children—
generosity, and oratory.®® The leaders were usually male
elders.

Because of the system of patriarchy that is
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predominant and manifested in almost all African societies,
males usually were chosen as chiefs or elders.

Also there

is a general consensus among Africans that wisdom comes with
age and experience.®®

Therefore, the elderly are major

assets in Africa, and usually occupy the highest positions
of tribal leadership.
In early African systems, kings or chiefs were not
necessarily paid for performing their duties; however, they
occasionally received gifts and dues from their subjects
because they were supposed to live well above common
tribesmen in order to enhance their status and the stature
of the tribe.

The traditional practice of offering gifts to

chiefs has been misinterpreted and misconstrued by scholars
to provide a cultural explanation for the pervasive
incidence of bribery and corruption in contemporary Africa.®®
The truth of the matter is that the offering or the exchange
of gifts among Africans is a traditional practice that dates
back for centuries and serves a variety of purposes.
For instance, in Sierra Leone when a plaintiff called
upon the chief for legal action/function, he offered dash
usually in terms of water, food, or drinks.

Among the Shona

of Zimbabwe, before a dispute was solved, the plaintiff and
defendant offered a small token or fee to the chief and his
"judges" that was later shared among the chief and his
chosen elders/adversaries.

In addition, the guilty party
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paid full cost of the case to the victor, who in turn shared
his compensation with the chief as a sign of gratitude for a
fair hearing.

The same practice was present among the

Asante of Ghana, the Luo, Luhya, and Gusii of Kenya, and the
Baganda of Uganda.®*
Under these conditions, a gift of dash or kitu kidogo
that is generously given to the chief and his elders is not
seen as bribery or corruption.

Rather, the token is seen as

some type of gratitude, respect, and appreciation for the
service rendered.
the courts.

One can see it as a tax that supported

As a matter of fact, gifts were given publicly

and everybody was aware of who gave what to whom and for
what purpose.

In contrast, today's bribes are extorted

clandestinely by civil servants before they can perform
services for the public which they are paid to render in the
first case.
In fact, in traditional Africa, there was evidence that
suggests that native Africans were intolerant of bribes and
corruption.

For example, in Ghana during the 6th and 8th

centuries A.D., there was a popular or mass revolution
against corrupt leaders, specifically the members of the
dynasty that routinely accepted bribes. The rebels
systematically massacred and even extracted fetuses from the
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wombs of the royal family in order to completely wipe out
corruption.®®
Does this mean that pre-colonial Africa was pure and
pristine or immune to corruption?

To the contrary.

Indeed,

for the kings/chiefs to live luxuriously, and they did,
mandatory annual taxes and dues were required of subjects.
Oftentimes, the chief's chosen tax collectors accepted
bribes or diverted the dues meant for the chief into their
pockets.

Also, they used the chief's office to extort

bribes or favors from the people in terms of drink, sex,
food, and money.

Thus, bribery and corruption were not

unknown phenomena in pre-colonial Africa.
Indeed, large-scale corruption manifested itself in
Africa during the colonial period; the introduction of
political systems, parliaments, urbanization, new currency,
white collar jobs, and schools contributed to competition
and bribery and corruption.

As Robert Williams asserts,

upon colonization African corruption began to become more
entrenched, especially in those countries where a feudal way
of life had already set the climate for corruption or a
gift-giving system of authority.®® Therefore, it is
imperative to recognize and appreciate that the unethical
behavior in post-independent Africa has a history outside of
and within Africa.

This is not, however, to justify the

continued existence of corruption in Africa, but to argue

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86

that large-scale corruption in modern day Africa has its
roots with the European colonialists as well as within the
Africans themselves.
The truth of the matter is, in East Africa and some
countries in Central and West Africa where Great Britain had
her colonies, the British used indirect rule, divide and
conquer, and Western influences such as religion, education,
English, sophisticated weapons, etc., to conquer and
dominate indigenous Africa.

As for the issues of

kings/chiefs, the colonialists bribed them with clothes,
guns, and other Western items to relinquish or share their
power, sell their subjects as slaves, and allocate land to
the colonists.

Similarly, the artificial partitioning of

Africa by the European powers in the late 1800s was by all
means morally corrupt because native Africans were never
consulted during the scramble for lands and territories in
their countries.

Instead, they were dislocated and

disoriented from their lands and forced to live together in
squatters while their fertile lands were grabbed and used
for cash crops— coffee, tea, cotton, and sugarcane
plantations, forced to adopt western lifestyles— systems of
government, constitutions, forms of education, religion, and
language.

One can make a strong case that, the natives were

stripped off their culture, dignity, and lifestyle by the
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European colonialists.

Indeed, this in itself is corruption

at its very best.
As the African saying goes, when the white men or
missionaries came to Africa they told Africans to close
their eyes for prayer.
men's eyes were open.

While they were praying, the white
It was during this time the whites

were able to grab the most fertile lands, usually at
gunpoint.

When the Africans opened their eyes and realized

that the white men's motives were lands, raw materials, and
cheap labor and not Christianity or "civilization", they
began rebelling to recapture their lands and lifestyles, but
it was too late because the colonialist's influence and
control had spread like wild fire.

The natives were told

not to close their eyes for prayer this time, but to sing
the Christian hymn— "trust and believe, for there is no
other way, but to trust and believe".

The literal

implication from this hymn was that the white men had taken
over Africa and the natives were better off if they trusted
and believed.

Therefore, the fact that Africans see

governments as the enemy or the tool of oppression is no
surprise.

According to many Africans, a good government is

one that allows avenues for personal enrichment.
In sum, the African nations that won their independence
from the European colonial powers are for the most part
uneasy confederations of tribes that are traditional
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enemies.

The primary loyalty of their citizens is not the

state, but the tribe and its chiefs.

The political

objective of the dominant tribe is to capture the country's
economic power base, which is the government, and once it
has been seized, to hold onto it.

Political corruption is

probably the most destructive moral disease in Africa.
Although this malaise is found in nearly all societies, it
appears to be especially virulent south of the Sahara with
the exception of some Southern African countries
particularly South Africa.

As some European entrepreneurs

with interest in Africa once stated, "they bribe a good deal
in Uganda, some in Kenya but not at all in Tanzania and
Zambia"®®, a tribute to the high personal integrity of Julius
Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, former presidents of the two
countries, respectively.

Therefore, corruption cannot be

"dismissed as 'one of those things'; it is an evil which
challenges the very bedrock on which our juridical
independence stands"®® assert Neil Jacoby et al.

What

emerges from these brief examples is a sense of the
pervasiveness of corruption that is practiced in both
developed and developing nations.

These scholars argue

that, political/government corruption often "declines as
society advances in its awareness and support of nationhood,
in wealth and income, in political and legal stability, and
in building of strong social institutions".®®

However, to
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make a case that, political corruption ends at some stage
with the social and economic development would be stretching
too far.

Indeed, in a world populated by human beings with

their moral frailties, desires, appetites, selfishness, and
lust for personal enrichment, to eradicate political
corruption from the face of the earth is perhaps a utopian
concept.®^

As Jacoby et al., conclude, "socio-economic

development does tend to curb practices that civilized men
and women agree are morally wrong and economically
inefficient".
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CHAPTER 3

THE CAUSES OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
"Not every black man is my brother.
Not every white man is my enemy".
— Lucky Dube
"Your pocket will decide".
— Ghanaian bribe request
"Every franc we give impoverished Africa,
comes back to France, or is smuggled into
Switzerland and even Japan".
— Le Monde, March 1990
An investigation into the causes of political
corruption in African societies would provide many different
explanations depending upon the question and time.
Generally and broadly speaking, the motives for corruption
can be divided into two categories: the external corruption-the legacy of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and dependency-and the internal corruption— the "Big Men" of Africa,
centralized states, inefficient leadership,
maladministration of government institutions and
parastatals, tribalism and nepotism, population explosion,
unemployment, and other physical and man-made realities.
Indeed, massive corruption in Africa seems to grow from
both historical and contemporary sources.

In fact, on a

continent where corruption is seen as "a way of life"^, it
would seem unrealistic and somewhat biased to blame a few
94
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"bad apples" or factors.

Despite extraordinary consequences

the exposure of corruption has had in recent years,
corruption is by no means new in political life.

On the

contrary, it has a long pedigree running throughout the
history of both pre-colonial and colonial periods.’ In fact,
it is not uncommon to find a large number of the African
public who admit that corruption is a "national feature" or
the "way things are done".^ However, as April Gordon and
Donald Gordon assert, corrupt practices among the
strategically positioned politicians, bureaucrats, and the
elites are rampant and habitual.* Therefore, one can
strongly argue that African elites' primary purpose is to
chase for profits and work for their own pockets at the
expense of the public.^ Yet when the question arises as to
why there is pervasive and habitual corruption in African
continent-wide societies, the legacy of colonialism and neo
colonialism are mentioned.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND COLONIALISM
It has been suggested and strongly argued that the
prevalence of government corruption in post-independent
Africa was brought about by colonial rule.

Indeed, Syed

Hussein Alatas agrees when he states that, "Not only was
there corruption in colonial administration but it was
further increased by the indirect effect of nationalist
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agitation against the government".° For example, in Nigeria,
Zaire, Kenya, and other British, French, Belgian, and
Italian colonies, during the period of colonial imperialism,
cheating, plundering, and stealing from the enemy government
was popularly considered as patriotic.

Protecting offenders

from the police, income tax evasion (land and dog taxes), or
hiding those individuals who were fighting for national
liberation/independence were regarded as heroic acts.

But

after independence (which for many of these countries
occurred in the 1960s), the habit of cheating and stealing
from the government continued.^ As of the 1990s, the trend
of stealing has increased and spread to the point of choking
the whole continent.
It should be borne in mind that the main purpose of
European imperialism in Africa was solely and purely the
economic motive— acquire raw materials, cheap labor, and
markets.

Thus, one can argue that the partitioning of

Africa during the late 1800s was geared towards enslaving
and exploiting Africa's natural resources and labor power.
The consequences were displacement, dislocation,
disorientation, and alienation of tribal societies from
their territories, lands, and resources.

The Biafran War in

Nigeria during the later 1960s was a result of colonial
rule.®

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97

Undoubtedly, the imperialists were successful in their
endeavors and managed to bulldoze their lifestyles and their
economic and political regimes into the African mindset.
While the British used indirect rule and a divide and rule
(instigating tribal confrontations) strategy to achieve
total collaboration and rule, the French and Belgians used
direct and cultural means to control their colonies.

In all

instances, the colonialists held out the carrot and wielded
the stick.

In essence, classes were formed, economic

opportunities and education established, especially in urban
centers, and some tribes benefitted more and wielded more
economic and political power than others.

Those tribes that

were at a disadvantage lacked economic and political power
and access to scarce natural resources and, thus, corruption
and bribery became tools of choice for penetrating any real
or imaginary barriers or roadblocks to government goods and
services.®
According to Robert Williams, the legacy of colonialism
can be blamed for economic underdevelopment, political
instability, tribalism, and political corruption.Because
the Europeans strived to bring "civilization" to Africa and
to transform its supposedly "barbaric" or "savage" ways of
life to modern lifestyles— in terms of language, education,
Christianity, political institutions, constitutions,
technologies, and machineries— disregarded African tribal
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and customary lifestyles.

Thus, as Europe attempted ro

bring modernization, civilization, and development to
Africa, it cast an image of "heroes doing battle with
cannibalism, lust, and depravity— the forces of
'darkness'

and uncultured people, which was not

necessarily the case.
Niccolo Machiavelli argues that civilization is a
factor in corruption, especially in civic political life.
He related civilization and the difficulty in establishing a
sound form of government in this manner:
"Doubtless.... anyone seeking to establish a republic at the
present time would find it easier to do so amongst
uncultured men of the mountain than amongst dwellers in
cities where civilization is corrupt; just as a sculptor
will more easily carve a beautiful statue from rough marble
than from marble already spoiled by a bungling workman".^’
According to Alfred Bonadeo, the assumption from
Machiavelli's statement underscores that corruption is more
likely to be found among those peoples whose civilization is
highly evolved, among the inhabitants of cities and,
finally, it indicates that where such corruption is present
it is vain to hope for the establishment of a republican
government.

Indeed, the same can be said of the

eradication of corruption in Africa.

Since people now know

the new way of corruption— through the exchange of currency-
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-it would be impossible to totally clean up this act.

In

fact, Africans say "mlamba hazari halambi mara moja" (one
who licks honey does not do it only once). When this idiom
is applied to government officials, it literally means that
as long as they are in charge of distributing scarce goods
and services, the temptations to become corrupt are
inevitable. Thus they will keep deepening their hands in
the national honey pot and lick not only once but from time
to time.

As the saying goes, "kawaida ni kama sheria"

(normalcy is like law). This literally means that, if
government workers are used to being bribed for their duties
and services, it becomes a routine or a "law" to expect
bribes before and after these services are rendered.
In the same vein, Samuel Huntington asserts that in
developing nations, particularly Africa, corruption is a
"virtually inevitable phenomenon of the initial stages of
'modernization'",^^ one likely to disappear/diminish as
African economies and nation-states move beyond the
infant/early phases of capitalist development, as tended to
be the case of Western Europe's bourgeois transition.
Additionally, other scholars argue that the aspirations
of Africa's administrative elites for the status symbols and
lifestyles of the continent's former colonial masters are
inclinations reinforced at the lower rungs of the
bureaucracy by the social disorientation of rapid
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urbanization, that is, the imbalance between rural and urban
development.-®

While the rural areas, where a majority of

African citizens live, are neglected at the expense of
cities, there is a high rural-urban migration for government
goods and services— jobs, social amenities, and a higher
standard of living.

This migration leads to overpopulation,

crime, unemployment, and a lack of housing and water, thus
necessitating corruption.

In Africa money talks and

character walks; who you know is more significant than what
you know; the highest bidder is more important than meeting
the qualifications or simply being in need.

Thus, as scarce

government goods and services, especially government
contracts, projects, jobs, housing, etc., are on sale, the
strong survive while the weak wither away.
Going back to colonialism, the international school of
thought also agrees that the aftermath of colonialism,
capitalism, and the exploitation of Africa by Western
countries necessitated corruption.

Indeed, with Africa's

overweighed dependence on economic/foreign aid, political
independence seems illusionary.

In this condition, the

notion of manifest destiny in Africa is far from real.
Roger Tangri also points out that "During the colonial
period, African countries were made both politically and
economically subordinate to the interests of imperial
capital....Local economies were subordinated to externally
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defined needs.... When the colonial bureaucrats departed from
Africa, they left behind highly distorted economies".*® To
date, this trend continues coupled with yet another new
fashion of colonialism— "back-door colonialism" or neo
colonialism.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND NEO-COLONIALISM
According to Ralph J. Onwuka and Timothy M. Shaw, neo
colonialism is the "survival of the colonial system in spite
of the formal recognition of political independence in the
emerging countries which become the victims of indirect and
subtle forms of domination by political, economic, social,
military, and technical means".

These scholars maintain

that the main "ploy of neo-colonialism is to make sure that
the dominated countries do not have much direct horizontal
contact among themselves, particularly, not economic
interactions or t r a d e " . I n fact, the chances of African
countries doing business and trade on a regional or
continental basis is slim to none.
Similarly, even after independence, many African
countries have not completely changed their political and
economic settings to reflect their own indigenous models.
Most countries still use former colonial constitutions,
laws, and economic apparatuses.

For example, Africa still

favors cash crops— coffee, cotton, and tea, etc— that are
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sold abroad (to the mother colonialists) for foreign
currency while neglecting consumer and immediate substance
crops, e.g., corn, sugarcane, and other agricultural goods
that could be used
problem of hunger.

for its population, thus alleviating the
The fact that Africa is largely an

agriculturalist continent and lacks the skills and
technology to tap its rich natural resources and manufacture
and consume its own goods, it is left with only one
solution— to rely on the Western powers to feed and solve
her problems.

Worse still, Africa is forced to dance to the

tunes of the western International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
World Bank (WB), and other international organizations.

A

case in point is that of Kenya, which was recently cut off
by the IMF for loan transactions amounting to $220 million
for having a large number of civil servants, too much
government repression, violations of human rights, and a
high level of corruption and bribery.One can argue that
in Nigeria and the

former Zaire, government repressionand

corruption are far

worse than in Kenya; yet the

international organizations for decades supported the
dictatorial leadership of Babangida and Mobutu, their
African puppets.
E.A. Boetang also observes that "the achievement of
political sovereignty does not automatically lead to
economic independence. . . . It is but a rubber stamp under
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the guise of self-determination.

Thus the Western nations

still dictate and chart the course that Africans should
follow lest they lose economic aid.

This, is essence,

destroys the self-determination and political sovereignty
that Woodrow Wilson intended to see in Third World countries
that were allies to the West during the First World War.
Clearly, until Africa fully realizes its full selfdetermination, until the West treats Africa as an

equal

partner in the world economy, Africa will forever remain a
spectator of world politics.

Therefore, the legacy of

colonialism, neo-colonialism, and dependence have
contributed to corruption in modern-day Africa.

It is April

and Donald Gordon's assertion that as long as Western
nations still assign Africa the role of the "producer of
cheap raw materials" in the global economy, they continue
to prevent Africa from "achieving its economic potential"
In addition, these scholars maintain that political
oppression, foreign exploitation, economic inequality, and
poverty contribute to corruption in sub-Saharan Africa.
Undoubtedly, "colonial policies worked to handicap
independent Africa's economic future".^®
Pertaining to neo-colonialism, African scholars,
particularly Ben Turok, contend that it "has brought both
hardship and social turbulence to many countries in the
Third World",especially Africa.

Turok, however, argues
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that the reasons for this dilemma are to be sought in both
external causes and in the inherited and developing internal
structure of neo-colonialism and imperialism.

He

particularly points an incriminating finger at the
international market as the primary cause for Africa's
chronic problems, including corruption.

He states that "the

deterioration in international trading conditions have
sorely reduced export earnings for previously high-value
commodities"^' such as gold, diamonds, iron ore, oil, etc.
Also, the unfavorable terms of trade for most African major
agricultural items— coffee, cotton, sugarcane, pyrethrum,
etc.— have inevitably hit the farmers crucially and directly
in income received and in government support.’® Turok
concludes that the basic reason for the new conditions after
independence in Africa is that "Whereas colonial rule was
exercised by an external force, neo-colonial rule is a
function of two powers— imperialism and an internal ruling
class".

POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND THE NATIONALIST SCHOOL
The nationalist school of thought agrees that rather
than blaming colonial rule for corruption, it is about time
to look at what is going on in the backyards of African
societies.

These scholars include Chinua Achebe, Wole
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Sonyinka, Bankole Omotoso, Ben Turok, George Ayittey, Ngugi
wa Thiongo, Kivutha Kibwana, and Blaine Harden, among
others, who blame African elites— leaders, politicians,
policy-makers, bureaucrats, businessmen, and top civil
servants— as the causes for corruption.

They point out that

overbearing executive powers, government repression, single
party states, big and centralized governments, inefficient
state institutions, the underpaid civil service, tribalism
and nepotism contribute a great deal to corruption.
Even though it is unanimously agreed upon that the
legacy of colonialism and today's neo-colonialism or
"international straightjacket" share some of the blame for
corruption, these scholars strongly think that Africa's
problems, particularly corruption, are self-inflicted
wounds.

They concur with Christopher Hitchen who writes:

"Yes, we know that colonialism was devastating and
disruptive. Yes, we know that political borders of Africa
make no sense and were drawn without regard to human
reality. Yes, no doubt the international trade decks are
stacked against African p r o d u c t s b u t

does this

explain why life is so much more "brutish, cruel, and short"
in modern Africa than during the colonial era?

Does this

justify why African elites are greedy, selfish, squander
maniacs, and corrupt maniacs? Or should this reality deter
Africa from removing the chains of backwardness?
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Indeed, Africa seeks scapegoats in the West to justify
corruption and her chronic problems— poverty, civil war,
crime, low living standards, and unemployment.

George B.

Ayittey notes that, "True, there was colonial exploitation
in the past, but today the real exploiters and oppressors of
the African peasant are often the African elites".®^ No
doubt, African megalomaniacs, corruptimians, and
squandermanians such as late Mobutu Sese Seko, Babangida,
Kenneth Kaunda, Hasting Kamusu Banda, Omar Bongo, Sani
Abacha, Paul Biya, and Daniel arap Moi, to name just a few,
keep amassing wealth and exploiting their respective
countries with impunity by stealing economic aid, by
treating their national treasuries as if they were their
personal bank accounts, and by stashing their riches in
Swiss banks.
To negate the factors of colonialism and neo
colonialism, conservative journalist Keith B. Richburg
contends that Africa, like some Southeast Asian countries,
e.g., Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc., were also
under colonial rule.

After independence during the 1950s

and 1960s, Asian countries have succeeded while Africa is
still in despair.

Richburg asks:

Why has East Asia emerged as the model for economic
success, while Africa has seen mostly poverty, hunger,
and economies propped up by foreign aid? Why are East
Asians now expanding their telecommunications
capabilities when in most of Africa, it's still hard to
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make a phone call next door? Why are East Asians now
wrestling with ways to control access to the Internet,
while African students still must use cardboard
drawings of computer keyboards because they don't have
real computers in the classroom? Why are East Asian
airlines upgrading their long-haul fleets, while
bankrupt African carriers let planes rust on weedstrewn runways because they can't afford fuel and
repair costs? Why are the leaders in Southeast Asia
negotiating ways to ease trade barriers and create a
free trade zone, while Africans still levy some of the
most prohibitive tariffs on earth, even for
interregional trade?.
To put these questions in perspective, why is it
relatively possible to travel throughout Asia, while it is
hard to travel within Africa?

Why is it possible for Asian

countries to do business on a regional basis while Africa
cannot?

Why are the Asian markets and borders open to

regional and world investors, while those in Africa are not?
Why is Asia blossoming with economic success, while Africa
lags behind?

The ugly truth is that, it is not because

Asians are workaholics and smarter while Africans are lazy
and dumb.

The cardinal reason for Africa's underdevelopment

resides within Africa.

Richburg argues that, for decades

Africa's failures "have been hidden behind the veils of
excuses and apologies".
Indeed, there is no reason why Asia should succeed and
Africa fail.

Richburg notes that, both regions emerged from

colonialism at about the same time and faced similar
obstacles.

For example, in 1957, when Ghana became
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independent from Britain, it was one of the brightest hopes
for black Africa with a higher gross national product than
South Korea, which was itself still recovering from a
destructive war and more than thirty years as a Japanese
colony.

Today, South Korea is recognized as one of the

Asian "dragons" or "tigers"— an economic powerhouse
expanding into new markets throughout the region and the
world at large.
backward.

In contrast, Ghana meanwhile has slid

In fact, today her gross national product is

lower than it was at independence.
Along the same line of argument, Kenya in the 1970s and
early 1980s was regarded as East Africa's success story, a
country in the horn of Africa that was destined to become a
powerhouse, a country bubbling with economic growth and
political integration, and a hub of an efficient civil
service, of transportation and communications networks, and
a haven for regional and international investment, a country
with a history of political stability and tranquility.
According to Julius Nyerere, Nairobi was the "London of
Africa", a role model to many in sub-Saharan Africa.

Today,

Kenya has been relegated to the dustbin of history due to
political corruption, tribalism, poverty, unemployment,
crime, police brutality, and dictatorship.

In short, all

forms of development have stalled just as in many other
countries in the horn of Africa.
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Nigeria was also another potential African powerhouse
blessed with oil reserves.

During the 1960s and 1970s,

Nigeria's gross national product was the highest in Africa.
Today, the country is ruled by marauding military tigers and
dictators who repress and take part in high levels of
corruption that make the lives of ordinary Nigerians a
nightmare.
The former Zaire (The Democratic Republic of Congo) is
one of those African nations blessed with diamonds and iron
ore.

Like Lagos, Kinshasa was at one time a bustling modern

city.

Today, Zaire is nothing but a huge hole in the middle

of Africa.

It has been raped by its former dictator,

Mobutu, and his colleagues, and today it is the eighth
poorest country in the world.
Additionally, the reason for this peculiar atmosphere
has to do with Africa's fear, suspicion, and oppression that
the "Strong Men" engender among the public.

Also, Africans

still cling to their tribal loyalties and identities instead
of a national loyalty and identity.

For example, one is

Yoruba or Hausa first and Nigerian second, Kalenjin first
and Kenyan second, or a Zulu first and a South African
second.

Although this may seem minutely insignificant to

some observers, where tribes are as numerous as they are in
Africa, tribalism cannot be treated as a minor problem.
has as much to do with underdevelopment as colonialism.
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There is no doubt in Ayittey's mind that what breeds
corruption and bribery in sub-Saharan Africa is purely "the
system of pervasive state controls, regulations,
concentration of economic and political power, the
institution of one-party state systems which lack
accountability, and the muzzling of the press to expose
corruption and wrongdoing.®® The truth of the matter is
that, these conditions are also present in East Asia and
other developing areas, but no place/region are these
conditions so severely instituted than is Africa.
Writing on the issue of muzzling of the press to
express government wrongdoing, Peter Warutere notes that by
attacking the press for exposing government and individual
corruption and other malfeasance of the African elites and
business, the government is being insensitive, illogical,
cynical, and undemocratic.

He, therefore, asserts that

governments that harass the media/press are "wrestling with
the mighty power of the pen" that feeds the public with a
for information and solutions to their problems.

He

concludes that, "victory can only be assured if there is
political will to suppress corruption, tribal clashes and
the other multitudes of critical problems which the
newspapers and magazines continue to highlight in their
quest for a transparent and democratic republic".®’
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For their part. Wraith and Simpkins support these
African scholars' claims when they state that, "In Africa
corruption flourishes as luxuriantly as the bush and weeds
which it so resembles, taking the goodness from the soil and
suffocating the growth of plants which have been carefully
and expensively bred and tended".®® Indeed, systemic
corruption has simply destroyed what took many years to
build.

Wangari Mathai notes that corruption has reached

devastating proportions, has destroyed and stalled democracy
and economic development, and has led to "non-accountable
and non-transparent leadership".®®

POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND THE "BIG MEN"
It is argued that those who suffocate and stall
development in Africa are the "Big Men", or the "Strong
Men", or the "national figures" or the "founding fathers" or
the "god-like" presidents.

According to Blaine Harden,

"Africa's traditional dictators and tribal chieftains— the
'Big Men'— have proven surprisingly tenacious..."^” in
corrupting and stealing with impunity Africa's scarce
natural resources.
In describing the "Big Men" or the African
excellencies. Harden states that, they can be recognized
everywhere because their pictures can be found on every wall
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and in office or business premises; their faces are on the
local currencies; highways, schools, universities,
hospitals, streets, avenues, shopping malls, football
stadiums, military academies, hotels, airports, and public
transportation services are named after them; they appear on
the front pages of the local daily newspapers; their daily
movements or undertakings are broadcast on radio and
television on an hourly basis; they ban political parties
except those of which they are members (usually the ruling
party); they harass political opponents, rig elections,
appoint and shuffle legislators/parliamentarians as they see
fit; they make, modify, or amend laws without question; they
receive the highest percentage of kickbacks and skim foreign
aid; they treat their national treasuries as if they were
their personal accounts, and stash their amassed wealth in
Swiss banks and/or invest in foreign countries; and last,
they are, tribalistic, all-powerful, brutal, tyrannical, and
all government institutions, i.e., courts, civil service,
universities, national hospitals, and parastatals are under
their t h u m b s . W i t h these characteristics, African leaders
have created what is referred to as Mobutuism, Moiism,
Abachaism, Bandaism, Biyaism, Kaundaism, Mugabeism,
Bongoism, etc.
Without a doubt, the "Strong Men" of Africa have poisoned
their respective countries, thus retarding economic growth.
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Referring to the former Zaire's former dictator, Mobutu Sese
Seko, Harden states that his "venality spawned a corruption
ethic that underdeveloped Zaire....'"*® David Gould also
stresses that in Zaire "where corruption was central in the
entire system of government and economic activity, the
embezzlement of state funds, tax evasion, extortion, and
other immoral practices facilitated the consolidation of the
economic base, one that largely arises out of the state
bureaucracy".'*®

In Zaire, as in many other countries in

Africa, one is either rich or poor; there is no middleclass .
In fact, during Mobutu's reign, those individuals from
his tribe, personal cliques, and members of parliament who
sung the tune of Mobutu's songs or supported his tyrannical
regime, or those who never "crossed him", benefitted
economically and politically.

Some rose to become

millionaires and succeeded in business because they captured
most of the government contracts, import-export licenses,
and fat kickbacks or "percentages", as they are often
called.'*^ Mobutu's family and friends spent three decade
looting Zaire and helped themselves from the earnings to the
copper, cobalt, and diamond mines.

According to the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United States
Treasury, Mobutu's personal fortune was worth four to five
billion dollars during its height in the 1980s.

Although
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Mobutu denied this report of his vast wealth as sheer
allegation, it is all too well known that denial is part and
parcel of African leadership.
Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, Sani
Abacha of Nigeria, Paul Biya of Cameroon, and El Had] Omar
Bongo of Gabon, to name a few, are seen as "god-like
figures", all-powerful, all-knowing, and presidents for
life.

Therefore, one can argue that, these "Big Men's"

omnipresence and repressive leadership is detrimental to
Africa's economic development and political integration
because they discourage foreign investments, free elections,
freedom of press and speech, unite among ethnicities, and
above all plunder national resources.
The fact that they amass wealth with impunity; buy
loyalty with hard currency using state resources; give
favors to their families and relatives, clans, tribes,
supporters, cliques, and friends; divide-and-rule; and stir
tribal warfare, they in essence preside over the collapse of
their respective countries, contribute to high-level of
political corruption, and induce it in others.

Yet they all

blame Western nations for their countries' problems.
Undoubtedly, therefore, one can make a strong case that the
problems with Africa lie with the political elites/leaders
themselves who plunder from their own national resources and
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steal from their own people and yet openly and vehemently
they deny this fact.**
Indeed, African leaders who embodied the hopes of the
African continent at the start of the independence period,
at a time when Africans proudly took the run of self-rule
and vowed to build fair and more just societies than they
had known under colonial rule, were the ones who became the
colonizers of their own people.

Makau wa Mutua reveals that

"Once they replaced the colonial rulers, they wanted to
become like them...they wanted to become all-powerful and
omnipresent....We just replaced white faces with black
faces".*’

POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND TRIBALISM/NEPOTISM
Nepotism is another factor in political corruption.
David Apter attributes corruption in Africa to the
persistence of traditional values which conflict with the
requirement for a secular way of life.

Nepotism or

favoritism is considered a grave crime in Western
bureaucratic practices, yet in Africa, providing jobs,
government contracts, business licenses, and promotions for
members of one's own family, clan, and tribe is considered
compulsory and quite normal.*® In fact, many Africans would
agree with this analysis— the more successful a civil
servant or politician becomes, the more he or she is
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expected to share his or her good fortunes with kinsmen.*®
Throughout Africa, asserts W. E. Abraham, the "family
conscience is terribly loaded with a proliferation of duties
and obligations owed to relatives known and unknown who may
spring up and demand attention when one is busily performing
his official duties".®® He goes on to say that clan welfare
takes priority over individual welfare.

This is because

African cultures emphasize clan achievement and cooperation
more than individual self-help.C. S. Whitaker, Jr., notes
that the "...high incidence of official corruption stems in
large part from conflicting pressures and expectations
regarding social and official positions, rather than from
any singular aptitude for venality on the part of those who
occupy them".
Generally speaking, these pressures emerge from the fact
that
ours".

Africans still believe in "yours is mine and mine is
And that it takes a village to raise a child.

Therefore, it is the child's responsibility and obligation
to serve his family, clan, and tribe.

Neglecting or

ignoring the needs of one's family and clan is the most
terrible thing one can do.

Generosity and assistance are

the most appreciated human qualities and the most admired
features in Africa.

For example, when a politician or a

member of parliament is generous, even at public expense,
all his faults are forgiven.

At the same time, African

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

117

elites derive satisfaction as well as prestige from having
people dependent on them.®® The simple reason why African
politicians and top civil servants surround themselves with
their fellow clansmen or tribesmen and/or immediate family
members and relatives is to avoid the accusation of
ingratitude or betrayal of family.

Kwame Nkrumah once

admitted, "I could not have chosen my government without
regard to tribal origin...and even within the party itself,
there was a tendency to condemn or recommend some individual
on the basis of his tribal or family origin".®*
Other factors that contribute to corruption include the
population explosion, the shrinking and scarcity of natural
resources and foodstuffs, and the high demand for scarce
goods and services— education, healthcare, housing, and
jobs.

Under these circumstances, nepotism and tribalism

oftentimes come in handy.

April A. Gordon notes that the

"patronage relationship based on ethnicity and kinship is
often potent to gaining access to resources (such as jobs,
schooling, or money) .... "®®
In the same vein, James C. Scott notes that kinship ties
and parochial loyalty to one's tribesmen often dictate who
gets what, how, and when.®®

Put simply, who you know is

more important than what you know.

He maintains that the

traditional obligations of kin, tribe, village, or religious
sect are so strong that they contribute to a certain amount
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of corruption.

It is not uncommon to find a politician or a

top civil servant who is at the same time an official of his
tribal or clan organization and a civil servant.

He may

take unwarranted liberties with state funds and place his
incompetent friends or tribesmen in office.

But in the

tribal or clan association, he is a scrupulously honest
guardian of the ethnic interest.®^

This is definitely what

Africans call a "good man", or a "man of the people", or a
"true son", or a "tribal hero".

Because the clan/tribe

engages his strong loyalties, the nation does not.
Therefore, to steal from the state burdens his conscience
little or not at all; to steal from his clan or tribe would
seem like stealing from his own family.®®
Because governments in Africa are the sole or largest
source of goods and services and the providers of jobs,
status, prestige, wealth, and security, "it's the dream of
every family and tribe to place at least one of his sons in
the public service; the demand for Western-style education
is, in part, a by-product of this demand for public
office".®® Hence, the "scramble" for jobs in the civil
service is a result of the opportunities one acquires
working for the government, e.g., status, prestige, avenues
to amass great wealth, and exercise of power with few
restrictions.®® Indeed, these are things a politician or top
civil servant does not want to "steal" from his

family or
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clan/tribesmen.

Publius Gamesu also states that the keen

competition for government employment contributes to
ethnicity and gives greater impetus to nepotism and
tribalism.®® Because there are big bureaucracies and a rapid
increase of civil servants with chronic lower salaries,
corruption and bribery is to most workers a supplementary
source of income.
Taking from Peter to pay Paul is not a new concept in
Africa, nor is it seen as an immoral thing, but rather it is
expected of those who are in power and in positions of
decision-making arenas.

The fact that those tribes in power

tend to take all and control all is a normal phenomenon.
This is not to argue that all government officials or tribes
engage in corruption for selfish or tribal reasons.

There

are, of course, a few good, decent, honest, and moral
leaders.

Nelson Mandela is a good example.

Wraith and

Simpkins write: "The ethnicity is there, but it has not yet
been transferred from the seat of natural loyalty, which is
the clan or tribe, to the new seat of loyalty which is the
state".®^ Put simply, due to the weak legitimacy of the
political systems compared to pervasive pressures and ties
of family and/or ethnicity, many Africans oftentimes serve
tribe first and country second.
Therefore, one can strongly argue that tribalism and
nepotism are two evils or factors that enhance and reinforce
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political corruption in sub-Saharan Africa.

Those tribes

that are unrepresented or under-represented or "left out" of
the government's political machine— economically and
politically—

find that their best shot/chance often is to

buy their way into the system.

Furthermore, severe poverty

and meager wages impel people to tolerate corruption and
bribery in order to survive.

Indeed, the majority of

government workers in many countries cannot afford a
balanced diet or three meals a day even if they spent all
their salaries on food alone.

Furthermore, with the signs

of affluence that people see around them— skyscrapers,
expensive cars, big houses, and the unequal distribution of
wealth— it is every person's dream to live a good life with
power, money, status, and prestige.
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that
civil servants are inclined to demand gratuities, speed
money or dash, or kitu kidogo before performing their
services.

Therefore, due to frustration, most government

workers are tempted to accept bribes to supplement their
meager incomes.

In sum, the historical legacy of

colonialism, neo-colonialism, the "Big Men", nepotism and
tribalism in concert cause political corruption in subSaharan Africa.
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CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND LEADERSHIP IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA: TRIBALISM AND PATERNALISM
"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute
power corrupts absolutely."
— Lord Action
"I am your god and teacher. I am the divine way,
the torch that lights the dark. There is no god
but Ali Solih".
— Ali Solih, the late president of Comoros
"After me, it will be upon you, if you allow
even monkeys to rule you".
— Daniel arap Moi, Kenya's president
"We know so little of Africa, the 800 [sic]
and some tribes that make up Africa... I say
it is like a different world".
— Senator Hubert Humphrey, 197 6
In this rapidly changing world, each decade/era has its
own political horizon, its own system of values, its own
experiences, its own political leaders, and, of course, its
own style of political leadership.®

According to John

Cartwright, "The essence of leadership is the ability to
persuade others to comply voluntarily with one's wishes"®.
However, when we endeavor to determine what creates this
ability to persuade, the cult of personality, attributes,
traits, ideology, and other elements that leaders possess
are hard to pin down, even though they play a significant
role.
125
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Leadership is an elusive phenomenon that eludes precise
definition.

James MacGregor Burns asserts that, "The study

of leadership has been largely neglected by modern social
scientists, who for both methodological and ideological
reasons have tended to concentrate on mass movements and
more easily measured phenomena. No one has yet developed a
general theory of leadership"®.

Nonetheless, when we speak

of "leadership" what comes to mind is the activity of an
individual who draws from his people to pursue his intended
goals.

In Africa, individuals such as Kwame Nkrumah,

Patrice Lumumba, Jomo Kenyatta, and Nelson Mandela appealed
to the masses in their endeavor to liberate their countries
from white domination.*
But leadership not only revolves around "heroic"
figures, but also around individuals who are capable of
compromising out of a diversity of conflicting interests.
For example. Nelson Mandela's ability to negotiate and
compromise with both white and black South Africans to
achieve harmony makes him a great leader.

In essence, the

ability of a leader to act, to persuade followers, and to
win their support with the intent of bringing his goals into
fruition and acquire legitimacy is what entails leadership.
Leadership does involve not only voluntary compliance
but also a special kind of power relationship between the
leader and the led— a symbiotic relationship.

Because of
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this special relationship. Burns contends that it is easier
for "leaders to induce followers to act for certain goals
that represent the values and the motivations— the wants and
needs, the values and aspirations— of both the leaders and
followers".® Therefore, leadership is the power and ability
to obtain non-coercion and voluntary compliance from
followers that enable both the leaders and followers to
achieve their goals.
However this is not to argue that leaders cannot obtain
compliance with coercion.

Quite to the contrary, tyrannical

political leaders, e.g., Adolf Hitler, Idi Amin Dada, Samuel
Doe, Jean Bokassa, Mengistu Haile Mariam, Kenneth Kaunda,
Kamuzu Banda, Sani Abacha, and Mobutu Sese Seko have all
ruled with an iron hand and, supposedly, acquired
legitimacy.

This kind of leadership, coercion, is, however,

short-lived.

Cartwright argues that "some material reward

is needed, and the resources to provide such rewards are
most readily obtained through control of the machinery of
the state"®.
In Africa, it is hard not to find politics and
political leaders untainted by high levels of state
centralization, coercion, favoritism, tribalism, and
paternalism.

The salting away of government favors,

contracts, developmental loans, etc., by the "Big Men" to
their tribesmen, cliques, cronies, and loyal friends is
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quite the norm.

As a matter of fact, politics in Africa is

influenced by tribal politics and tribal leadership.

In

other words, the style of political leadership in Africa is
by and large that of the paternal and tribal model.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND TRIBALISM
When the focus turns to African politics, scholars and
journalists oftentimes use terms such as "tribe" or
"tribalism" to analyze the issues, but do not do the same
for other parts of the world.

As a matter of fact, the word

"tribe", when applied to the African people, refers to
something far different than when it is applied to North
American Indians, Australian aborigines, or even European
ethnic groupings.®

Additionally, some African tribes are

described as village states, empires, or in terms of
language groups.
According to Paul Bohannan and Philip Curtins, the term
"tribalism" became common in European writing about Africa
in the 19th century.

They argue that, in the era of the

slave trade, Europeans usually talked about different
African "nations" or tribal-nations, but under colonial rule
these "nations" became "tribes".

In fact, European

colonialists often encouraged Africans to band into tribes
to make it economically less costly to administer and easier
to divide and rule.®
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Keith Richburg contends that tribalism or ethnic selfinterest remains the defining feature of politics and
political leadership in Africa.

Because there is a lack of

a sense of nationalism, i.e., national identity, among
African people that can transcend tribalism, political
leaders— the "Big Men" often play the "tribal card" to come
to power and/or remain in power.®

Scholars argue that the

style of political leadership revolves around paternalism—
"Strong Men" and tribalism.

This style of leadership is to

most leaders a means to an end.

Even among some of Africa's

most charismatic heroes— Lumumba, Kenyatta, Nkrumah, and
Mandela— the manifestation of tribal politics was/is
evident.

To understand the role of tribal politics, it is

vital to define tribalism as a concept.
In Webster's dictionary, tribalism is defined as:
An organization, culture, or a belief of a tribe. A
tribe, on the other hand, is a system of social
organization comprising several local villages, bands,
districts, lineages, or other groups that share a
common ancestry, culture, language, name, and
territory. Within the tribe, there is solidarity and a
sense of identity among people.
In Africa, tribalism is as old as Africa and forms the
primary mode of leadership.

Fred Burke asserts that,

"tribalism or the value and behavior patterns that can be
attributed to tribal organization and life, is not so much
disappearing or reappearing as it is changing in form and
substance".®®

In fact, with the partitioning of Africa by
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the Europeans in the late 1800s, tribes were displaced,
dislocated, and/or forced to live together.

Therefore,

colonialism indeed reinforced tribal conflicts and
competition for scarce economic resources and political
power that have enhanced the tribal warfare/conflicts that
exist to this day in modern Africa.
Regarding ethnic/tribal groups, Nigerian Chief Obafemi
Awolowo once said:
It is a mistake to designate them 'tribes'. Each of
them is a nation by itself... There is as much
difference between them as there is between the
Germans, English, Russians, and Turks....Their cultural
backgrounds and social outlooks differ widely; and
their indigenous political institutions have little in
common. ®®
Due to tribal or ethnic differences among the peoples of
Africa, it is not surprising to find politics and leadership
based upon the tribal setting.
No doubt African leaders oftentimes rule as
kings/chiefs.

In fact, in pre-colonial Africa, "larger

tribes generally possessed more highly developed political
systems wherein a paramount chief or divine right king ruled
the tribal nation through the agency of a hierarchy of
lesser chiefs...."®® In the same way, some modern day African
leaders rule with absolute power over their people/
subjects.

As a matter of fact, these leaders make policy

decisions individually and/or with the assistance of selfappointed officials.

Therefore, because African leaders
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emerge from traditional settings, they oftentimes adopt and
rule as elders or chiefs— something that comes to them
naturally.

This is because during their childhood and

adulthood, they were raised under the leadership of the
elders or chiefs at the village level.

Therefore, when they

become leaders themselves, they tend to follow the
traditional (elder/chief) styles of leadership even in
modern settings.
Some scholars argue that the politics of ethnicity
take the

behavior they do because they are the only forms

of identity that exist or are presumed to exist in many
African societies.

The fact that leaders rule as elder or

chiefs and consistently offer favors to their own
tribes/ethnic groups in terms of jobs, government contracts,
business licenses, and development grants is to nobody's
surprise.
The unending competition among other tribes and former
chiefdoms for these scarce goods and services often leads to
conflict because of ethnic consciousness.

Under such

circumstances, competition and conflict are bound to occur.®-’
This ethnic factor is commonly referred to as "tribalism"
is so salient that Melson and Wolpe think it instigates
conflicts that, in turn, produce tribalism and not vice
versa.®*
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Tom Mboya probably sums it up best when he writes that
one of the microcosmic factors for the persistence of ethnic
sentiment among African leaders is that, "They are still to
some degree 'communal' because of their background and their
relatives remaining tribal, and so they themselves cannot
afford to change at the risk of offending and losing their
family. "®®
Most significantly, however, is the need for a leader
to create and maintain a power base.

It is Elliot Skinner's

contention that, during the colonial era, any "African
leader with universalistic values found that he had to
appeal to group identity based on descent, if he would
galvanize his followers to seek political power."®® And after
independence, as P.H. Gullivers argues, "African politicians
necessarily require a firm base for their operations in the
still unstable, inchoate national arena. What better, in the
short run, to ensure support, electoral and other, and to
wield a powerful political weapon, than to stand as the
representative and spokesman of the tribe?"®®

Even those leaders who wished to operate as
nationalists stood to risk losing tribal support.

For

example, Jomo Kenyatta's dilemma in the 1940s was, as
William Ochieng contends, a win-lose situation.

Ochieng

states that Kenyatta "wished to operate as a nationalist
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leader of Kenya, but the Kikuyu were planning in tribal
terms".®®

This dilemma can be applied to almost all African

leaders.
In sum, it is important to cite Colin Legum's theory
about the importance of a reciprocal relationship between
the leader and the led:

"The elitist political leader in

the modern system needs his 'constituency' invariably a
tribe or at best a region— on which to rest his power, just
as the tribal or regional constituency needs its royal
representatives to defend and promote their interests in the
modern sector".®® Therefore, the leader's entrapment or
dilemma to meet his tribesmen's and followers' demands and
needs is indeed a driving force behind African political
leadership.
While it is true that tribalism causes political
corruption, ethnic conflicts, and retards development (the
"curse" of modern day Africa), political leaders seek to
secure class position and power by "constructing intratribal patron-client hierarchies defining social conflicts
in terms of ethnic relationships...."®® and for the purpose
of acquiring legitimacy.

In fact, African leaders derive

their power base and legitimacy first and foremost from
their ethnic groups, and through a patron-client
relationship.

Therefore, tribalism and clientalism should

not be treated as phenomena peculiar to the so-called

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

134

"primitive world”. According to Deborah Kaspin, "African
tribalism is, in fact, fairly typical of identity politics
so richly in evidence in the world at large".®®
African ethnicity is treated differently from European
ethnicity as reflected in the media coverage of "tribal
warfare" in Rwanda as opposed to "ethnic violence" in
Bosnia.

Cohen states that, "somehow, ethnicity is more

primordial in Black-Africa than it is in white Europe.
Social scientists have scrutinized this concept from several
perspectives and treated it alternatively as a fundamental
aspect of identity."®® Therefore, ethnic politics and ethnic
leadership are part and parcel of the African political
system.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND PATERNALISM
On the other hand, paternalism— the "father figure" or
strong man syndrome— is another form/style of leadership in
Africa.

Paternalism derives its meaning and function from

patriarchical societies whereby a father is regarded as the
head of the household, the breadwinner, provider, and
protector of the family.

As for the ethnic group or tribe,

a king/chief is the head, protector, and overseer of the
needs and demands of a whole ethnic group or tribe.

Tribal

kings/chiefs rule with the help of several self-appointed
sub-chiefs who are answerable to chief the alone.

In fact.
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tribal kings/chiefs possess absolute authority because they
are regarded by the tribe as "fathers" or "strong men".
In the same way that chiefs once ruled, modern day
African leaders rule as "father figures" entitled to
absolute power in decision-making, and oftentimes, of being
above law.

To win trust and support from the general

public, a leader must prove that his policies provide
benefits to his people.

Cartwright asserts that "trust can

derive from a number of attributes perceived in the leader
by his followers: selflessness, age, intellectual ability,
militance, or even familiarity".

Perhaps selflessness, the

perception that what the leader is doing is for the good of
all and not particularly for his benefit, comes closest to
being a necessary ingredient in creating this bond.

"In

Africa, respect for age has given a number of leaders a
powerful hold over their countrymen. Felix Houphouet-Boigny,
"Le Vieux" of the Ivory Coast, Jomo Kenyatta, "Mzee" or the
"wise leader" of Kenya, William Tubman, "the Old Man" of
Liberia, and Dr. Milton "Pa" Margai of Sierra Leone all
enjoyed wide respect for the presumed wisdom and detachment
that age and experience gave them".®*

Other rulers built

their bonds on quite different qualities.

For example,

"Kwame Nkrumah presented himself as militant, and eventually
took the military title of "Osegeyfo", the warrior redeemer.
Julius Nyerere has always cast himself a 'Mwalimu' the
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teacher, and appears to maintain respect in the role of the
thoughtful intellectual".®®
Blaine Harden argues that, in Africa, everything from
the judiciary, legislature, civil service, parastatals,
media, and schools are under the Big Men's control. These
Big Men regard themselves as all-powerful and honorable.

In

fact, most leaders often use heroic titles to make their
case.

Daniel arap Moi, is known as "Baba" (father) of

Kenya, Mobutu Sese Seko as the "cock" of Zaire, and Nelson
Mandela as a warrior of south.

Some even insist on being

called "doctors", "teachers", "conquerors", "the big
elephants/lions", "the number-one peasants", "the wise old
men", "the national miracles", "the most popular leaders in
the world", "the immortal beings", or "the gods"

In fact,

the major reason why strong men are corrupt in contemporary
Africa is purely because they can use their absolute strong

men's power to use their government treasuries as they
please.
The fact that they are supposedly entitled to a blank
check as national providers and comptrollers of the state
resources necessitates political corruption.

In fact,

"Strong Men" use the state's resources to feed a personality
cult that defines them as incorruptible, all-knowing,
physically strong, courageous in battles, sexually potent.
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and kind to children and the public at large.

However,

these leaders' rules have one overriding goal: to perpetuate
their reign as Big Men.®®
Therefore, under such circumstances, they create
patron-client relationships to ensure loyalty and legitimacy
and thus enhance political corruption.®’ More often than
not, tribalism and paternalism are the norm among these
leaders.

For example, the eras of Mobutuism and Moiism are

just two illustrations where both tribalism and paternalism
played a great role in political leadership.

Therefore,

paternalism and tribalism— kinship ties or parochial tribal
identity of a leader-led relationship— dictate "who gets
what, how, and when".®® These two evils are ultimately the
cause for political corruption.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND CHARISMATIC LEADERS
According to Richburg, "corruption is the cancer eating
at the heart of the African state. It is what sustains
Africa's strong men in power, and the money they pilfer,
when spread generously throughout the system, is what allows
them to continue to command allegiance long after their last
shreds of legitimacy are gone".®®

The question whether

charismatic leaders, e.g., Nkrumah, Lumumba, Kenyatta, and
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Mandela, ruled/rules as tribal chiefs is emphatically "yes".
In the case of Nelson Mandela, a leader "who proudly
displays a non-tribal stance, some of his followers
nevertheless kill each other as Zulus and Xhosas".®°
Furthermore, Mandela is accused of providing favors to his
Xhosa tribesmen, especially among the ANC's top executive
officials.
As for Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Richburg writes that,
"Kenyatta was a harsh autocrat, a tribal chieftain of the
first order who believed that it was the Kikuyus's national
right to rule."®® Kenyatta consistently gave his Kikuyu
tribesmen favors in terms of business licenses, farms,
development grants, government contracts, top governmental
positions, government scholarships, jobs, etc., thus
enriching the Kikuyus.

In the same footsteps that Kenyatta

took, today the Kalenjin, the country's smallest tribe under
Daniel arap Moi, has done the same thing.
In the case of Kwame Nkrumah and his advocacy of PanAfricanism, the tasks that faced African revolution were
"the struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, the
liquidation of economic and cultural backwardness, the
overcoming of tribalism."®® He was later, however, accused by
some African politicians of having "just one goal in mind—
to establish Ghana's hegemony in Africa and satisfy his
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personal ambitions".^'’ Nonetheless, Nkrumah was truly the
best example of a dynamic African leader.

In his book,

Africa Must Unite. Nkrumah wrote, "Africa needs a new type
of citizen...a dedicated, modest, honest, informed man. A
man who submerges self in service to his nation and mankind.
A man who abhors greed and detests vanity. A new type of man
whose humanity is his strength and whose integrity is his
greatness" .
Patrice Lumumba of Congo/Zaire also belonged in the
company of Nkrumah, Nyerere of Tanzania, Tom Mboya of Kenya,
and Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea.

These leaders believed

that the only way to build an effective modern state free
from the shackles of narrow tribal loyalties was to create a
single, and central government".^® Lumumba, although
identified with his Beteteta tribe, was also able to attract
the strongly expressed loyalties of a tribally-heterogeneous
body of the Congolese.

Because of this factor, Lumumba was

truly the only national political leader.

Although he was

assassinated, Lumumba is still regarded as "a true son of
Africa, and in his short unhappy lifetime, he was accepted
as belonging to all of Africa, not just Congo".^ Whatever
the case, it is truly impossible for a leader to be nontribal in a multi-racial setting.

Indeed, Lumumba, Nkrumah,

Nyerere, and Toure's regimes were not necessarily less
paternalistic or tribal in nature.
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Tribalism may sound like an old cliche', but it is
still part and parcel of Africa's body politic.

Similarly,

ethnicity dominates Africans' social and political life.

It

is Richburg's assertion that it is tribalism that prompted
the Rwandan Hutus to exterminate tens of thousands of the
Tutsis; that it was tribalism that recently turned Kenya's
Kalenjins against the Kikuyus in the Rift Valley Province;
that it is tribalism that turned the Zulus against the
Xhosas; and that it is tribalism that has caused human
atrocities throughout Africa— Zaire, Burundi, Somalia,
Ethiopian, and the Sudan.
Richburg maintains that, political leaders are willing to
play the tribal card, to unleash tribal passions and
rivalries for their own sinister motives, and to create the
kind of violent chaos and atmosphere they need to justify
their grip on power.

Sadly, all too many Samuel Does,

Juvenal Habyarimanas, Siad Barres, Mengistu Haile Mariams,
Daniel arap Mois, Mobutu Sese Sekos, and Sani Abachas have
proven to do just that.

Wangari Maathai also adds that

"...many of the current African leaders enjoy immense power
and control and indeed run states as if they were their
personal property... invent divisive and manipulative
tactics, e.g., politically-motivated tribal
clashes/conflicts among ethnic groups in order to stay in
p o w e r B e c a u s e of this factor, most Africans have totally
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lost faith in the political leadership of their countries.
In fact, all throughout African society there is a
noticeable absence of national pride and patriotism or a
sense of national identity simply because of tribalism and
paternalism.
In sum, it is quite in order to argue that, in Africa,
politics and leadership are significantly influenced by both
paternal and tribal practices.

This style/model of

leadership varies among different countries and societies
both in substance and magnitude.
practically,

But theoretically and

political leadership in particular revolves

around tribal politics.

Sadly, this trend was/is evident

among some charismatic leaders, e.g., Lumumba, Nkrumah,
Kenyatta, and Mandela.
Therefore, one can draw a general conclusion that
political leadership in sub-Saharan Africa has a lot to do
with paternalism and tribalism/ethnicity and above all
political corruption.

Indeed, one cannot study political

corruption in sub-Saharan Africa without linking it to
political leadership.

These two concepts have a symbiotic

relationship and often times they reinforce each other.

For

example, if the leaders are corrupt, paternalistic, and
tribalistic, surely, one expects bad leadership and vice
versa.

Truly, a good leader such as Nelson Mandela serves
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as a role-model or example to the general public and the
African continent as a whole as to what good leadership
entails.

To eradicate political corruption and ensure good

governance in sub-Saharan Africa, leaders such as Mandela
are essential.
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CHAPTER 5

THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
Political corruption has its roots in ancient times.
Philosophers, including Aristotle, warned that the states
that wished to prevent revolutions in their monarchies,
oligarchies, and democracies ought to guard against
inequalities that arise out of corrupt practices by those in
public office or public affairs.

He stated that "Every

state should be so regulated by law that its magistrates
(read public servants) cannot possibly make money.... People
do not take great offence at being kept out of
government;...What irritates them is to think that their
rulers are stealing the public money".^

For example, in

Rome, "unscrupulous gain from forbidden sources"^,
especially the practice of bribe-taking was vehemently
condemned and punishable by death.

This is because bribery

contributed to political and social decay and thus affecting
economic growth.^ Clearly, even though political corruption
has its complex manifestations in polities, it nonetheless
remains one of the most destructive phenomena in the history
of mankind and within contemporary societies.
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Gregory Jaynes, for example, states that in recent
years the complex interactions between multinational
organizations and national governments, the bubba-ocracy in
America,“ the narcotics undercover agents in Latin and North
America®, the Gonzalez crisis in Spain, the political
scandals in Italy® the current crimes and resistance to
reform in Russia’, are spurned and lubricated by the hydra
headed phenomenon of corruption.

The truth of the matter is

that, whichever way scholars and people across the globe may
view political corruption, its consequences are undoubtedly
damaging and deadly.

Countries in Third World nations,

particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, are the worst
affected.
From a philosophical point of view Alatas states that:
Corruption promotes nihilism and cynicism.... creates
the composite problem such as the 'brain drain' of
educated people from third world societies. In such
problem corruption is a major contitutent and combines
with others to form a composite whole. Administrative
inefficiency and parasitism are other examples of
composite problem.®
Consequently, the end results grand corruption are
injustice, inequality, and human misery.

For example,

during periods of famine, and as recently as 1994, many
Somali children and adults died of malnutrition and other
diseases because Somali warlords and public officials stole
relief supplies, food, and medicine that were meant for
emergency and humanitarian purposes.

From 1992 to 1994,
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within Rwanda, Burundi, the former Zaire, and many other
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, it was reported that
government officials were stealing relief supplies and
selling them on the black-market, thus exacerbating the
suffering of the poor, sick, and powerless.
Syed Hussein Alatas contends that countless episodes
of injustice are clearly visible to those who wish to see in
the majority of Third World countries, particularly Africa,
where total systemic corruption is the order of the day.® In
the same vein, Stanislav Andreski cites many cases of
injustice that are generated by corruption in West Africa.
He states that in hospitals, for instance, patients pay
nurses to bring them bedpans, and doctors too take bribes
before treating or providing medication to the patients.
Furthermore, medicinal supplies are stolen from dispensaries
and public hospitals and sold on the street for profit
and/or are stocked in doctors' private clinics.

In fact,

this pathological behavior of medical practitioners and
other government workers applies within almost all of SubSaharan Africa.

Alatas notes that without bribing doctors,

nurses, or hospital staff, nothing can be o b t a i n e d . I n
the 1990s, it was found that for years within Kenya's
Ministry of Health, dead people were on the payroll and were
still "receiving" monthly paychecks and other bonuses.

The

beneficiaries were top civil servants within the Ministry.
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Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins cite cases in Nigeria
and elsewhere in West Africa in which outpatients had to
bribe nurses and doctors in order to be admitted to
hospitals or clinics and receive treatment.
applies to people without jobs.

The same thing

For these unfortunates, the

only way to acquire job application forms is by giving dash
or bribes to government officials.

In fact, job-seekers

have to hand out bribes starting from as low as janitors to
clerks to bosses.

To arrange for an interview, it takes a

series of illicit tolls, "speed money", to become eligible.
Even after employment has been secured, dash to the bosses
does not stop.

Rather it takes a different shape.

Monthly

"gifts" or "pocket money", lunch, and other entertainment
items are continually extorted from lower civil servants by
their seniors.

The penalty for not complying can be

transfer to remote areas and hardship regions or even
demotion.
This kind of systemic corruption is what Andreski
Stanislav calls "kleptocracy"— a state that steals.

Its

results are as follows:
The losses caused by corruption exceed by far the sum
of individual profits derived from it, because graft
distorts the whole economy. Important decisions are
determined by ulterior motives regardless of
consequences to the wider community. When a useless
factory is built in an impossible place simply because
the former owner of the site bribed the official into
buying it for an exorbitant price, then the cost to the
community must exceed by far the profit of the
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manipulators. An administrative machine permeated by
graft does not respond to direction, so that even a
most enlightened and personally honest leader can
achieve nothing, his instructions are perverted in
execution; and the network of collusion is so thick
that he goes as in a fog. Every bureaucratic machine
suffers to some extent from aversion to initiative and
originality, from sycophancy and the preferment of
intriguers and yes-men. But when graft adjoins these
normal diseases the administrative services become a
mere machine of extortion, scarcely able to maintain a
minimum of public order, let alone to engage in
successful economic planning.
For a government plagued by systemic corruption such as
was the case with the former Zaire, neglecting various
duties and obligations essential to effective administrative
management and smooth-running of a country is the end
result.

It is Wang An Shih's assertion that a corrupt state

always neglects its responsibilities and obligations in its
exclusive attention to political corruption.

This neglect

may reach a point that it becomes callous, disastrous, and
deadly to the whole society.’® For instance, the deadly
plague of ebola that killed many Zaireans in recent years
was a result of the government of Zaire, and in particular
that of Mobutu, neglecting to provide basic hygiene,
sanitation, and preventive measures against the disease.
Consequently, the death toll escalated and caused havoc in
certain regions of the country.

Meanwhile Mobutu and his

cronies were busy continuing to enrich themselves.
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Additionally, the loss and shortage of the water supply
in Accra, Ghana, in 1979 was brought about by years of
neglect in maintaining the Ashiaman reservoir.

The effect

of the lack of water in the capital of Ghana was alarming
and damaging to the public.

Shih goes on to state that,

"During this period Ghana stood at the brink of a calamitous
epidemic and consequent national disaster. Children drank
from filthy pools; water from gutters was collected for
human consumption; septic tanks remained unflushed for days
and Accra stood in shame".
THE FUNCTIONAL AND DYSFUNCTIONAL IMPACTS
OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
The question is : does political corruption have
functional or dysfunctional impacts?

While some scholars

see corruption as dysfunctional others see it as functional.
According to Charles Schwartz, corruption is on a micro and
macro-level dysfunctional because it breeds and feeds upon
economic wastefulness, investment distortions,
administrative anarchy, political misrule, and social
disintegration.’® To put this in perspective, in Somalia,
Ethiopia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Zaire, Cameroon, and Kenya, corruption has bred
disastrous effects such as civil war, ethnic conflict, coup
d'etat, starvation, poverty, and human suffering.
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Morally, corruption leads to ethical decay and instills
a negative, widespread belief that state property belongs to
no one in particular and, therefore, is free for all.

On

the systemic level, due to chronic mismanagement of state
property, people lose hope in their governments and laws.
Thus instead of joining hands to clean or fix a corrupt
state, they spend their energies plundering scarce
resources.

Perhaps there are no other societies that so

strongly believe that what belongs to one belongs to all
(free for the taking) than are African societies.

Among

African states, property mali ya serikali is like holy water
that everyone helps himself to.
Politically, corruption promotes apathy that arises
because of the pilfering and wasting of state property.
This leads to alienation, cynicism, and a reluctance to
fight corruption or crimes that are related to bribery, and
graft.’® It is Schwartz's argument that black, gray, and
white types of corruption altogether breed specific patterns
of corruption that contribute to blocking political
development and economic growth.”
In contrast, other scholars, particularly Stephen
Morris, contends that the analysis of the consequences or
functions of corruption hinges on the dialectic between the
capacity of corruption to serve as a source of spoils among
the elites on the one hand, and its negation of principles
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of conduct set out by the legitimizing ideology on the
other.

He argues that, from the state perspective,

corruption can enhance stability of the organizational
components of the state and formal procedures that reflect
popular legitimacy.

Although corruption may provide a

pragmatic co-operative device to gain political support
crucial to the survival of the system, it can also be
antithetical to legitimacy.’® Because corruption provides an
avenue for the illegitimate enrichment of a group of elites
at the expense of the public/majority, legitimacy crises can
be the ultimate consequence.
Morris asserts that corruption plays a great role in
integrating and accommodating the different state actors—
patron clients, political teams, middlemen, politicians,
policymakers, and their supporters by facilitating
cooperation and creating a cooperative mechanism for the
rising middle class by distributing spoils, implementing
flexible public policy, facilitating social mobility, thus
crippling mass-based organizations.’®
Political corruption also helps to bolster the feelings
of legitimacy among political elites by offering material
benefits to those who play the game according to the rules
and support the status quo, thus standing to benefit
financially and politically.

James C. Scott states that
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government supporters are handpicked by presidents to occupy
strategic positions and are endowed with power to distribute
goods and services as they see fit, and in so doing, they
help to draw mass support and mobilize public participation
in order to maintain the status quo.^°
Indeed, the use of corruption and bribery to integrate
an elite and stabilize the system by "buying" with hard
currency support, especially from those members of the
opposite political parties (defectors) into the ruling
party, is rampant and crucial in most African nations.

In

Kenya, for instance, it is known that President Daniel arap
Moi buys potential opponents with state money by handing out
hard currency, cars, houses, land, business sites, and
government loans payable without interest, thus encouraging
them to defect to his ruling party, Kenya African National
Union (K.A.N.U.).®’

In Nigeria, the former Zaire, and other

military-ruled regimes, political or military leaders buy
off top military officials in return for supporting or
protecting the state against potential vigilantes or coup
d'etat from within and without.

The truth is, throughout

Africa the practice of buying top civil servants, military
officials, politicians, or opponents is part and parcel of
the African style of leadership.®®
Joseph Nye remarks that corruption allows certain
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political actors a means of escaping the constraints of
policies that may not be in their best interest.®® Nathaniel
Leff also notes that by permitting this behind-the-scenes
influence, corruption also allows non-ideologically
sanctioned actors an extralegal avenue to influence public
policy at a more secretive implementation stage.®''
Furthermore, corruption provides a vehicle whereby
political actors as well as criminals "buy" immunity from
criminal prosecution or "purchase" well-paying government
jobs or promotion.®®

Indeed, for many people throughout

Africa, political corruption has at one time or another
helped solve a serious problem or dilemma, particularly when
directly dealing with government institutions or
bureaucrats.

In this way, those who benefit from illegal

connections often support the existing government and thus
contribute in enhancing political stability.®®
Within the tribal setting, the so-called "divide and
rule" principle has become a sure tool that African
presidents use to guard against ethnic unity and revolution.
This tactic helps leaders maintain their rule and
legitimacy.

Even when their legitimacy is waning, leaders

often buy off their political opponents, powerful
politicians, and members of those ethnic groups they see as
"troublemakers" to secure their rulership.

Usually, they

hand out hard currency, loans, government scholarships.
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contracts, jobs, and promotions and build schools, clinics,
and roads.®’
For instance, scholars argue that President Daniel arap
Moi of Kenya sees the Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya, and Kisii tribes
as "troublemakers" and thus buys them off from time to time.
He directly appoints or nominates them to powerful and
crucial government cabinet ministries, to Parastatals as
executive directors, to top military positions, as
ambassadors, university chancellors, provincial
commissioners, and district commissioners. This does not
mean that Moi cannot demote them if they fail to support his
government or as Kenyans say, they do not "fuata nyayo"
follow his foot-steps.®®

It is also argued that Moi is one

of the "worst tribalistic" leaders in Kenya.

He has made

sure that his Kalenjin tribesmen are placed within every
strategic sector of government, Parastatals, non
governmental organization, military force, university,
provincial and district level, national and local levels to
guarantee his rule.®®
The same can be said of Nigeria's dictator, Sani
Abacha, who buys off members of the Ogoni and Yoruba tribes.
The same goes on within his military force.

Also the late

Mobutu Sese Seko used the same strategy and gave favors to
his cronies and favored tribes.

These are only three

examples, but the same can be said of almost all African
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presidents and countries.

Viewed from these presidents' and

their beneficiaries' perspective, corruption and bribery can
function because it helps to enhance their rule, prolong
their leadership, achieve political stability and
legitimacy, and enforce public participation and support.
It is also James C. Scott's assertion that political
corruption can be functional at a personal level because it
contributes to stabilizing the political system by
discouraging horizontal mobilization of the classes or
occupational groups.®® What this means is that, while
corruption benefits the few who support the system, it
discourages any potential group that may decide to overthrow
the existing government, because those that benefit from
corrupt deals or transactions also serve as "watchdogs"
against any uprising or revolution.
Scott goes on to remark that this occurs in two ways:
First is that corruption adds to the potential of co-opting
leaders of potentially powerful and threatening horizontal
groups, e.g., labor unions, non-governmental organizations,
and women's organizations, into supporting the system.®’
Indeed, this trend is a common practice in Africa because it
allows powerful labor leaders and top executive officers the
opportunity to exploit their organizations and to enjoy
other privileges from the government in return for
supporting the government of the day and by controlling the
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demands of the labor unions, workers, and women.

Simply

put, they assist in taming workers and women to ensure that
they support and vote only the rule of the controlling
political parties.®®
In most African states, women's organizations often
become the right arm of the ruling parties.

Because women

"hold the sky", that is, they are in the majority, political
leaders want them on their side for support and votes.
Often, women vote the president's party line or else they
may encounter roadblocks or risk government subsidies,
financial support, loans, and business licenses.

In Kenya,

for instance, the Kenya Mandeleo Ya Wanawake Organization
(M.Y.W.O.) usually takes orders from the presidential level.
The government is also usually very aware of and behind many
women's undertakings both on national and local levels.
Candidates running for MYWO's executive offices are usually
either handpicked or supported by the government.

The

president makes sure that the chair is a Kenyan African
National Organization (KANU) supporter and is capable of
mobilizing women at both national and local levels to
support and vote in favor of the ruling party's
initiatives.®®
Secondly, Scott contends that corruption can make it
relatively easy to channel demands through the system in a
personal fashion at the implementation stage rather than
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through broad-based pressures at the policy-making level.
This personal contact with political officials yields more
superb outcomes than when dealing with a large group of
people.

Stephen Morris concludes that corruption promotes

political stability especially on the part of the elite
through its integrative tendencies.

It also encourages

political pragmatism and helps the elite smooth the rough
edges of public policies by altering their implementation.®®
Put simply, corruption can facilitate co-optation among
different groups and enhances political stability.
Charles Schwartz, on the other hand, argues that
political corruption, particularly the white type, can be
functional because it serves as an essential lubricant in
otherwise rigidly regimented political regimes.®®

He

maintains that, within the administration sector, bribes and
clandestine gift-giving and abuse of power can be functional
for governmental capacity to the extent that it cuts
bureaucratic redtape, provides greater managerial
initiatives and responsibilities, and allows for legitimate
business expenses to be recovered through
misappropriations.®’
Nye also argues that for political corruption to have a
generally beneficial effect on political development, it
must meet three cardinal conditions.

The first is a

political culture that is tolerant or corrupt, the second is
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a greater security for political elites, party hierarchy
members, and politicians close to the president, and the
third is the existence of adequate societal or institutional
restraints on corruption through law.®®
Throughout Africa, corruption is tolerated because
political elites often deviate from morality and the rule of
law while dealing with administration, governance, and the
public.

Second, all presidential "cliques" have full the

protection of their presidents or government institutions
and, thus, they are above the law and hardly ever do they
get prosecuted or punished (jailed) for being corrupt.
Because the political elites are protected, this dulls their
sense of public responsibility; nor are they answerable to
the public apart from the presidents only.

Third, due to

arbitrary and capricious African laws and their inadequacy
to define what exactly constitutes corruption, gifts and
bribes are oftentimes used interchangeably.

For those who

attempt to define corruption, they are either vague,
ambiguous, or mute.

For example, in Kenya there is no law

that prohibits conflict of interest, thus making it legal
for politicians and other political elites to engage in
business when they want— and all of them do.®®
Walter Little and Eduardo Posada-Carbo argue that grand
corruption can boost the overall growth rate by increasing
the investment ratio and improving the marginal productivity
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of capital.

They state that this "accumulation thesis is

most likely to hold where corrupt rulers feel secure enough
to reinvest the surplus which they illegally extract".'*®
According to these scholars, if corrupt leaders invest their
illegally acquired wealth by creating jobs and building
infrastracture such as roads, bridges, schools, hospitals,
and public airports, this would assist in raising the living
standards of their people and the trickle down effect would
be realized.

Dr. Nathan Ozobia also notes that:

If all Africans would plough their ill-gotten money
back to their countries and communities, the trickle
down effect can be possible. But the bitter truth is
that African leaders are not willing to take that
chance. They are better off stashing their wealth in
the Swiss banks and other foreign countries because of
paranoia.'*’
The classic examples of those leaders who keep their
ill-gotten wealth hidden in foreign countries are from
Nigeria, the former Zaire, and Kenya.

For these leaders,

corruption provides an avenue to amass wealth and siphon it
away unnoticed and undeclared.
the late Mobutu Sese Seko.

Take for example the case of

All his ill-gotten wealth was

stashed and scattered throughout the world from Africa
(Morocco, Gabon, and Comoros) to Europe (France and Belgium)
to North America (the United States) to South America
(Brazil) and, of course, other countries where he owned
villas, hotels, ranches, houses, and businesses.^®

The same

is true with Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, Sani Abacha of
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Nigeria, and Paul Biya of the Cameroon.

This behavior

clearly damages the economy of Africa and contributes to its
perpetual underdevelopment and political disintegration.
According to Colin Leys, a society that lacks effective
public morality cannot develop economically.

The fact that

Africa's development depends upon government action in terms
of planning and allocation of funds towards development,
achieving these goals requires single-minded hard work,
integrity, the rule of law, and moral principle at all
levels— leaders, office-holders, and businessmen.

Without

this simple rule of thumb, the chances for economic growth
and social and political development would be minimal.*®
Unfortunately, the reason why Africa's development has
stalled is primarily because its elites often consume all
their energies and time getting rich quickly through illegal
transactions, corruption, and placing self-interest above
public interest.
Writing on the issue of morality and economic
development, Patrick J. Dobel clearly sums it up by stating
that :
An immoral society is where moral life has, so to
speak, been privatized. As a result, social relations
are characterized by complete self-interest and fellow
citizens are seen as instruments, obstacles, or
competitors. In the immorally corrupt society, civil
virtue and social responsibility are abandoned and
intense competition for spoils become the dominant
social mode.**
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Other scholars argue that, due to Africa's high level
of immoral behavior, i.e., corruption, bribery,
embezzlement, abuse of power, selfishness, and lawlessness,
economic and socio-political development have been hindered
or compromised.

Undoubtedly, political corruption is the

most devastating problem second only to tribalism or
ethnicity in Africa.

According to Schwartz, this disease is

dysfunctional because it leads to policy and investment
distortions, theft of state property, and wastefulness.*®
Indeed, in Africa corrupt maniacs loom large like predators
on the streets of Dakar, Mogadishu, Khartoum, Maseru,
Timbuktu, Lilongwe, Lagos, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, and
Kinshasa.

Due to the slow prospect of democracy and reform

against bribery and corruption, this problem will inevitably
continue to damage African development.

As the era of

Moiism, Bandaism, and Abachaism, among others, continues to
ruin development, there is an increasing continent-wide need
for decentralization, privatization, downsizing of the civil
service, limitation on executive authority, term limits that
will force African governments and leaders to become
accountable, transparent, and democratic.

Indeed, the

Berlin Transparency International Conference has joined
hands with many Africans to reform and clean up bureaucratic
corruption by using the power of the purse by denying
economic aid to corrupt countries.*®

However, as Schwartz
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notes, new nation-states, particularly in Africa, cannot
confidently curtail the dysfunctions of corruption without
sacrificing the functional utility that in most of Africa is
badly needed.

THE GRAND POLITICAL CORRUPTION: ECONOMICALLY
AND POLITICALLY DESTRUCTIVE
George Moody-Stuart also asserts that grand corruption
which involves influencing policymakers can be politically
and economically destructive in Third World nations,
especially Africa,

He states that where high-level

corruption is rampant, there is no hope of controlling petty
corruption.

Economically, grand corruption increases the

cost of the transaction.

For instance, if a business person

pays a ten percent bribe to top government officials to
acquire government contracts or a license to start a company
in a certain region or area, he will increase the prices of
his goods to offset the loss (money used to bribe). On the
other hand, if the sale involves imported goods and
services, the cost of goods will increase in order to
balance the transaction.

Furthermore, pushing aside cost,

quality, delivery, and other legitimate considerations in
the awarding of contracts, the possibility of wrong or
inefficient suppliers and contractors selected is higher
because it depends on the highest bidder.

In the end, the
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possibility of purchasing the wrong goods, using inefficient
contractors, and building shoddy infrastructure is high.^
Arguing from the same point of view, the former British
Minister for International Development, Linda Chalker,
strongly states that "corruption is a major impediment to
development."**

Michael Elliot argues that those who think

that corruption is a way of doing business in Third World
countries and Africa and that bribery is a cultural norm are
dead wrong because bribery and corruption are not part of
everyone's culture.

He notes that this excuse is vehemently

and indignantly rejected by honest Africans, Arabs, Asians,
Europeans, and Americans.

Chalker, in particular, does not

think that corruption is "a necessary fact of life that
helps the wheels of government and business to turn".*°
Elliot argues that corruption slows economic growth.
He articulates that:
Leaner times have given corruption a nastier taste. It
was easy to joke about the size of a Rolex watch on the
wrist of a general in Lagos when Nigeria's oil economy
was growing. But since 1980 most of sub-Saharan Africa
has grown poorer, which has made sumptuary excesses of
the wabenzi that much harder to swallow. It's merely
unpleasant to have to pay $12 to a junior Zimbabwean
official for a driver's licence. But even strong
stomachs turn when— as happened in Angola— a social
welfare minister imports three hundred Mercedes-Benz
cars into a country racked by civil war.
Indeed, it is unpleasant for government officers earning
less than five thousand dollars a year to own a series of
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transportation businesses— "matatus" (mini-buses), big cars,
houses for rent, land for developing, real estate, importexport businesses, and contracting companies, as is the case
in most African countries.

The truth is, most of these

wealthy men and women have gotten rich through illegal means
i.e, corruption.
Corruption also affects even the most sophisticated and
developed nations in the world, especially the United States
of America.

Amitai Etzioni poses the question:

"Yes, one

can say there is evidence of corruption, here and there. But
how encompassing is the effect? Is it eating away at the
margin, or has it wormed its way into the core?"*^

He

argues that corruption has spread beyond such low levels
into systemic or institutionalized corruption.

In America,

he contends campaign contributions are a form of legalized
corruption."

But, one may ask, if campaign contributions

are legal, "how are they corrupt, and if corrupt, how are
they legal"?**

The answer to this question is that "what is

ethical is not always legal, and vice versa".**
Additionally, he argues that, in American politics,
legislators either buy their seats or sell their votes
illegally for favors and private interests in violation of
public will, moral principles, and the rule of law.

He goes

on to remark that this legalized form of corruption is the
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most damaging and the most prevalent in contemporary
America.

Etzioni state that:

References to corruption in Washington scenes of
Abscam, of Congressional members calmly stuffing their
pockets with bribe money, embarrassed only by their
pockets' not being deep enough to accommodate the day's
take.
Indeed, one can argue that

corrupt transactions not

only involve members of Congress, but also other political
elites throughout the United States who often use their
power and positions for personal gain and to influence
public policy.

To use Representative James A. S. Leach's

fancier phrase, "A government of the people, by the people,
and for the people cannot be a government where influence is
purchased through large, private campaign contributions"."
Today, in American politics the issue that is hotly-debated
and investigated by congressional committees deals with what
influence some businessmen, both foreign and domestic, had
in the 1992 presidential victory.

In short, the issue of

illegal campaign contributions or "dirty money" that
implicates the President Bill Clinton and Vice President A1
Gore is the talk of Capitol Hill.
The issue of "dirty money" not only applies to the
United States, but also to all of Africa.

Indeed,

politicians and parliamentarians receive or demand big
contributions or "percentages" from local businessmen and
foreign investors before casting their votes on certain
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bills or laws.

Often, decisions that are made benefit these

elites personally as well as their "clients".

For example,

the concessions that Mobutu made with some Western investors
benefitted him and his cronies

and not the people of Zaire.

It is reported that Mobutu stole "diamonds from his country
to the tune of $15 million a year".*®

Similar practices go

on throughout Africa whereby scarce natural resources are
used to enrich a few political elites who have power.
Stephen Morris also notes that corruption breeds
bureaucratic inefficiency and waste and undermines
legitimate social programs; especially when public funds are
diverted by government officials to reward only those few
who support the status quo, legitimate policy objectives are
undermined.** In the same vein, Kenneth Johnson states that
corruption "defeats whatever quest there may be...for
concrete government reforms".*”
Undoubtedly, the reason why Africa seems to be
"developing", but somehow never really develops has to do
with corruption.

The truth is that African countries take

one step forward and two backwards.

Instead of spending

their money on improving their communities by constructing
roads, schools, water projects and hospitals; by funding the
agricultural and economic sectors; by revitalizing rural
areas; and by training workers, thus creating jobs and
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raising living standards, most of their resources go into
building private airports and palaces, purchasing private
jets, building churches, and funding private armies.*^
Additionally, scarce resources are squandered through
the creation of complicated corrupt schemes and procedures.
For example, the purchase of public lands by government
officials who later resell them to the government for public
works, recreational purposes, construction of business and
office complexes, hospitals, and schools is a common
practice in Africa.

The ongoing land grabbing schemes in

Kenya by political elites serve as a classic example.
Politicians and top businessmen buy public lots during
auctions and resell them for ten times more than the
purchase price.

As reported by the Daily Nation, even plots

designated for public cemeteries and schools are being
grabbed by politicians."

Kenya is only one example; these

same practices apply to other African countries as well.
Therefore, as social projects that benefit the majority are
continually compromised for personal gain, legitimacy,
stability, economic growth, and political integration are
hard to attain.

A CULTURE OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
Perhaps the most pernicious effect of corruption on the
public at large has been fostered by a generalized "culture
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of corruption".

According to Victor Le Vine, "such a

culture exists when politically corrupt transactions become
so pervasive in a political system that they become accepted
norms"."
Africa.

This is a common practice or norm in contemporary
In fact, if one asked how often Africans pay bribes

when dealing with government bureaucrats or officials, the
answer is not surprising.
and almost always
rendered.

Bribes are compulsory ingredients

required before goods and services are

This also applies to foreign investors.

Corruption also invades virtually all dimensions of
social life, producing what Morris calls a "spillover
effect", or to use Syed Hussein Alatas' term, a "metastatic
effect".

Alatas defines metastasis as, "a growth of

pathogenic micro-organisms or of abnormal cells distant from
the site primarily involved by the morbid process".®*

It is

a transfer of disease from one organ or part to another not
directly connected to it.

Typically, metastasis refers to

the spread of malignant tumors to different parts of the
body.

Therefore, the nature of the malignant process is

significant in understanding corruption.
The cancerous or malignant process begins as
progressive, unrestrained division of abnormal cells.
Viewed through a microscope, cancer cells may initially
maintain some degree of differentiation— that is, their
specialized structure and function— so that they
resemble those cells from which they arise or some
developmental stage of the tissue of origin. Some
cancer cells may perform limited normal functions. As
the disease progresses, however, the structures usually
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becomes increasingly abnormal in appearance, structure,
and function until they may not be recognizable as an
offshoot of the tissue of origin. They may appear in a
great variety of sizes and shapes. Chromosomes in
malignant cells undergoing division may appear
oversized or may have symmetrical spindles or other
abnormalities.®*
The analogy of cancer cells to political corruption is
the fact that corruption can become unrestrained and can
multiply and spread into other organs and perform
dysfunctional roles.

The same can be said of corrupt men,

who, if unrestrained, can cause their corrupt actions to
multiply and spread, thus affecting honest and hardworking
men and women.

This analogy shows us the essence of the

pathology of corruption.®®

Morris argues that the

"spillover effect" from bureaucratic corruption can extend
into non-governmental institutions, businesses, private
schools and universities, and churches."

The same is true

with bribes or "dash", "kitu kidogo", or "speed money".

It

can spread from top public officials to lower civil
servants, to private employees dealing with government, and
to the common man, "mwananchi".

Corruption can be very

contagious.
Moreover, in Africa the culture of corruption exhibits
a sub-cultural acceptance or glorification.

This is what

Alatas refers to as the "demonstration effect".

This effect

is expressed in the lifestyle of corrupt officials and the
wealth that they display.

In fact, this can give the public
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the impression that corruption is indeed productive and
worthwhile.

The advantages of corruption are made visible

so that others are encouraged to become corrupt— diamonds,
Rolex watches, palaces, big cars, villas, luxury private jet
aircraft, houses, etc.

This glorification or demonstration

of ill-gotten wealth can contribute to a variety of
problems, e.g., divisiveness, cynicism, contempt for honesty
and, eventually, the rejection of ethical values.

It can

also promote anger, crime, and lawlessness that may lead to
revolution, a coup d'etat, or civil war.®®
In Africa, the bitterness, anger, and cynicism that
have emerged due to corrupt government officials and leaders
have spawned civil wars and competition and conflict among
ethnic groups, hoping to control the governments and natural
resources and, thus, acquire power and wealth.

No doubt,

the on-going bloody civil wars, ethnic conflicts, religious
violence, and the attempted coup d'etats Rwanda, Burundi,
Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia,
Liberia, Zaire, Uganda, Congo, and Nigeria can be attributed
to corruption and tribalism that result in inequality in
sharing the national cake.

Put simply, it is about the

powerful against the weak and all are fighting to control
the economic sector.
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POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A CANCEROUS DISEASE
Paul Harrison asserts that corruption is a cancer at
the heart of most Third World nations, especially Africa.
He writes that, "It eats away at the foundations of trust
between people and their rulers. It exemplifies the two key
weaknesses of developing states. The unholy marriage of
political and economic power, whereby money buys influence,
and power attracts money; and the 'softness' of state's
inability to apply and enforce its own laws and regulations,
so that reform— even if it is legislated— rarely gets put
into effect".®*

He notes that corruption "riddles every

part of the public edifice like a bad infestation of
woodworm" .
For example, in 1975 Ghana's official Commission of
Inquiry into bribery and corruption reported that corrupt
practices were rife in almost all governmental departments.
The commission found out that more than one hundred sixty
cases of corruption practiced ranged from "staff
appointments, promotions, transfers; clearance of goods from
customs; allocation of market stalls; leakage of exam
questions to students,; privileges for prisoners; sale of
files on criminal investigations to the criminals being
investigated. Nothing was sacred and secure against graft.
Mortuary attendants were even demanding payment to release
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dead bodies to relatives. And priests were extracting
'gifts' in exchange for burying non-churchgoers in
consecrated grounds".’* Indeed, this pathological behavior
is practiced on a continent-wide basis.
The most commonly used methods or phrases by Ghanaian
officials and elsewhere in Africa tend to confuse and
flatter members of the public on the complexity of
government procedures and the chains of bureaucratic
redtapes.

Often times, civil servants purposely subject the

public with intolerable delays in providing them with
services and thus suggest that a bribe might produce a quick
solution, or preferential treatment.
as "speed money".

This method is known

In indigenous Africa, "gifts" were rarely

solicited in public or openly.

But today, phrases or

"lingos" are used that have developed into a language of
fraud.

These range from those direct phrases, e.g., loosen

your hand, bring out a feed for me. let your pocket decide.

let something talk, to the ambiguous : are you strong?, can I
see you in the corridor?, can we talk behind the bus/truck?.
can you strech my neck?, can you see me in the dark?, can
you meet me in T. G. I.

F . ?.

buy

S O m e - C p ffe S f

ta lk .tO

JUS.

well, talk like a man, make me laugh, to the most bizarre
phrases such as clean nana's scandals, utter a hornbill cry,
let your armpit collect water, to the clue phrases.
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-it is dry, -show me a sign ot rain, the government has not

paid us. etc.’*
As Neil H. Jacoby et al., argue, payoffs are so much a
part of nearly every culture that most languages provide
words for them.

In Africa, they range from baksheesh

(Egypt), dash (Nigeria), tarif de verre (Zaire), kitu kidogo
or something small (Kenya), and kiinua mgonog (Tanzania).
In Central-South America, it is jeitinho (Brazil), coima
(Peru), mordida (Mexico), and pajada (Honduras).

In Asia,

it is hatchien (Hong Kong), sin bone (Thailand), makan siap
(Malaysia), uong sogok (Indonesia), and legay (Philippines).
In the Middle East, it is roshveh (Iran), roshvat
(Pakistan) , and "spend money" (India).

In Europe, it is

baksissi (Greece), pot au vin (France), trink geld
(Germany), bustarella (Italy), vzyathat (Soviet Union), and
in North America, it is "payoff" in the United States.’*
In sum, political corruption creates a climate of moral
degeneration and makes a mockery of government. It promotes
decadence and malaise, makes government incompetent and
undermines its ability to rule.

It creates injustice and

chaos; it leads to political disintegration and cynicism; it
promotes immoral behavior and violations of the rule of the
law; it discourages honesty, hard work, and meritocracy; it
promotes ethnic conflicts, civil war, crime, and violence;
it creates economic inequality; it contributes to political
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instability, legitimacy crises, revolutions, coup d'etats;
and it leads to economic downturns and a lack of democracy
and development.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT
To grasp how political corruption impedes development
and democratic change in contemporary Africa, a definition
of what development and democracy means is pertinent.
According to James H. Mittelman, "development is the
increasing capacity to make rational use of natural and
human resources for social ends".’* Meddy Mugyenyi adds that
development means "to cope with internal and external
demands. It includes increasing the capacity of individuals
and collectivities".’* Therefore, development means
creating abundant goods and services by controlling one's
environment for the sake of improving the socio-economic
conditions of the people as a whole.
In contemporary Africa, development is not only
understood from a communal point of view but also on a
personal level.

April Gordon and Donald Gordon write that:

For ordinary Africans, development is seen in personal
terms. It means additional money for children's school
books, usable roads to allow the farmers to get their
products to market, electric lights in the village,
affordable rice and flour, and a health clinic within a
walking distance. Development too is measured by access
to land, jobs, and better housing.’®
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Furthermore, development means better living conditions
and economic growth, i.e., an increase in per capita income
and access to basic human goods and services and, of course,
self-sustainable development which, according to Joe Barkan
et al., emerges largely from within the country's resources
and not necessarily one "generated by resources injected
from the o u t s i d e " T h e point these scholars are making is
that resources or economic aid from outside often open a
window of opportunity for political corruption, waste, and
exploitation that leads to lack of development.
The primary question is:

How does corruption affect

political and socio-economic development in post-independent
Africa?

Underdevelopment or lack of development can be

understood from both external and internal perspectives.
Externally, African economies are unmistakably tied to those
of Western capitalist countries, especially those in Europe.
Africa, like many other Third World regions, exports raw
materials, largely agricultural products, and imports heavy
industrial materials and finished goods. Within world
markets, it is argued that there is a huge trade imbalance
or market price transactions between African and Western
nations. While Africa's raw materials continue to fetch
lower prices on world markets, those of capitalist nations
earn extraordinarily more, even when it is proven some are
of cheaper or lower qualities.’® Therefore, the fact that
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the world market is stacked against African goods; because
Africa is exploited on all fronts by the Western capitalist
countries (a form of corruption), and because the African
voice is politically impotent or unheard in world trade
transactions, her development plans, especially at levels of
economic growth and self-sufficiency are seriously affected.
This condition or predicament is what John Galtung
refers to as dependency.

He asserts that due to external

exploitation and the unequal relationship between the core
and periphery countries, the latter heavily depend upon the
former for their development.’* Other studies also show that
Africa's economic development is seriously affected by
economic domination and excessive exploitation by the West.
Gordon and Gordon contend that "the wealthy, developed
countries (the 'center') prevent (the 'periphery') from
developing".

Indeed, economic exploitation, neo

colonialism, or "back-door colonialism" has contributed a
great deal to Africa's underdevelopment and debt crisis.
Large-scale borrowing from international financial
institutions and a tight link to the world economy leads to
"an extreme dependence on public actors from outside Africa,
particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank..."®^ to chart Africa's development.
Conversely, lack of development is also brought about
by internal conditions within African governments.
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George B. N . Ayittey articulates, "For decades, African
radicals railed against colonial plunder, American economic
imperialism, the avaricious propensities of Western banks,
the predatory practices of multinational corporations, and
the tight-fisted International Monetary Fund as the causes
of Africa's economic crisis"." Even though Western
countries' financial corporations and international markets
are stacked against African goods, Ayittey still believes
that Africans, and particularly their leaders, are the
primary cause for a lack of political and socio-economic
development.

The truth of the matter is that some Third

World nations, especially many in Asia that experienced
conditions similar to those in Africa, have achieved great
heights of economic growth and success at regional,
continental, and global levels.
economic "tigers".

In fact, some have become

Cases in point are Singapore, Hong Kong,

South Korea, and Taiwan.
Similarly, as reported by the World Press. Review. "One
cannot gainsay allegations that in the majority of cases the
continent's leaders have besmirched their character through
corrupt and dishonest deals".®* Indeed, there are numerous
cases of government fraud, embezzlement, bribes, kickbacks,
extortion, and political elites' skimming economic aid
throughout the continent; yet many people still blame
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Western capitalist countries for Africa's snail's pace of
development.
To the contrary, Africa must be blamed for its lack of
development.

It is Michael Chege's assertion that African

governments spend huge sums of borrowed money and scarce
national resources on their militaries and purchase
sophisticated weapons and other unnecessary equipment for
defense purposes rather than wisely investing scarce
resources to create jobs, better living conditions, and
infrastructure.
Generally speaking, political corruption leads to
gigantic diversions of Africa's scarce national resources
and public funds into private hands, especially within the
political elites and their cronies and/or ethnic groups."
Furthermore, even the economic aid that is given under
strict and exorbitant rates or injected into Africa for
development purposes ends up in the bottomless pockets of
political leaders and top civil servants and military
echelons "who are strategically placed and have access to
local power and the fruits of public office".®®
In essence, political corruption prevents economic and
political development rather than promoting it.®’

For

instance, instead of investing and concentrating in the
agricultural sector, the backbone of Africa's economy, the
revitalization of rural areas where the majority of Africans
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live, attempts to provide farmers with adequate
infrastructure— all-weather roads, a steady water supply for
irrigation, fertilizers, plans to offer basic needs such as
immunization clinics and medications, schools, and job
training— often go nowhere.

Instead gigantic presidential

empires, estates, business complexes, palaces, skyscrapers,
personal monuments, and airports are constructed in the
cities. Expensive and unnecessary military weapons are
purchased, personal police forces (known as the Special
Branch) are created, and national treasuries are used for
bribing political opponents and buying ethnic groups— all
for the sake of seeking legitimacy.

These personal

aggrandizements are made possible by graft, kickbacks,
corruption, and use of the national treasury as a personal
fiefdom.
For example, within Nigeria, as in many sub-Saharan
African countries, the gap between the rich and the poor is
quite big and evident.

Richard Olaniyan claims that

corruption breeds inequality, unemployment, grinding
poverty, and anti-social behaviors such as violence, crime,
cynicism, and ethnic cleansing.

He specifically writes

that, "the unsudden and unmerited affluence corruption
brings to some people, the scandals of cases of embezzlement
have created a gap between the government and the masses".®*
Throughout Africa, the truth is that the rich are getting
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richer while the poor are getting poorer and the gap between
the two is widening.

Also, due to the culture of graft and

bureaucratic corruption, governments are often seen as the
major enemy and the cause of inequality and injustice.
Thus, it is no surprise to see civil servants abuse their
power or use their offices for personal enrichment and/or
perform their duties only for those who can pay.*”
Another scholar who strongly believes that corruption
seriously hinders development is Michael Chege who asserts
that corruption and graft cannot be dismissed in Africa's
body politic as just another passing cloud; rather it is a
deadly disease.

He argues that political corruption has

been identified on a continent-wide basis as the "poison"
that chokes development.**

Ben Turok also makes a similar

claim that corruption hurts political and socio-economic
development throughout Africa.

He articulates that "despite

a powerful rhetoric in favor of development, the development
process...in practice is uneven and limited"." Indeed, any
signs of development can be seen only in urban areas while
rural areas are compromised and ignored for showcase
businesses in the urban centers.
Aside from political corruption, the government's
repressive mechanism that cracks down on anti-corruption
crusaders and agencies such as the press, political
opponents, and the public has become a norm, not the
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exception.

Scholars argue that without a tradition of

democratic processes, economic growth and political
integration will continue to be paralyzed for many years to
come.

Robert Rotberg, in particular, contends that since

Africa lacks the democratic traditions necessary for
development, attempts to develop are unlikely to succeed.
He argues that, "corruption and zero-sum government bedevil
Africa, flourishing as they do in the absence of meaningful
participatory processes".** Indeed, recent deaths in Kenya
and the crackdown by the government on political opponents,
university students, and the public who are demanding
constitutional reforms for the purpose of fair general
elections scheduled at the end of this year serve as a
classic example of how public participation is discouraged.
Thomas Callaghy also argues that the processes of
democratization have been uneven in contemporary Africa,
because for years the governments have opposed democratic
pluralism or multi-party systems that fight against
political corruption.

He therefore thinks that

"developmental democracies" are unlikely in Africa soon.
also asserts that, even with Africa's democratic rhetoric
and recent transition towards political democracy or
pluralism, corruption is still more rampant.**
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POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIZATION
But what is democratization and how is it perceived in
Africa?

Sarah John Kpundeh states that democratization

involves public participation, competition, fair elections,
majority rule, political pluralism, political liberation,
and freedom of the press and speech, among others." The
description of this concept is what Mugyenyi refers to as
"maximalist democracy". According to him, maximalist
democracy "is more generous. It is phenomenally popular. It
centers around popular participation in the allocation of
values. But it also incorporates majority government, rights
and freedoms related to speech, assembly, dissent,
intellect, life, property, dignity, liberty, office,
opposition, opportunity, movement of the press".*®
Furthermore, he argues that maximalist democracy "implies
certain forms, structures, institutions, and procedure of
government..."*’ which, unfortunately, is lacking in Africa.
Thus, he concludes that democracy comes to protect the
accomplishment of development in what he calls "development
first, democracy second".*® This means that, without
political, social, and economic development, democracy alone
is not going to liberate Africa.

Even though democracy is

an important ingredient for good governance, some people
still argue that Africa does not need democracy per se.
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Instead, it needs economic growth, political integration,
and basic needs— food, clothing, shelter, better living
conditions, education, jobs, housing, healthcare, and above
all, political stability and tranquility that are necessary
for development and democracy.
To the contrary, some scholars argue that, without
democratic processes, attempts for development will be
hindered as it is in Africa today.

There is certainly an

element of truth in this argument that without democratic
institutions to fight political corruption, the primary
cause for underdevelopment, economic growth and political
integration would be remotely out of reach and eventually
what would result is "dysfunctional development".**
Undoubtedly, political corruption leads to unstable
democracies, empathy, alienation, cynicism, and mistrust
between leaders and the masses.

It also threatens attempts

to establish efficient government, transparency,
accountability, and finally, it stalls development and
democracy. *°°
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CHAPTER 6

COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
KENYA
"L'etat, c'est moi" (I am the state)
— President Daniel arap Moi
Kenya, a former British colony, gained independence in
1963 and became a republic in 1964.

According to recent

statistics, Kenya's estimated population totals thirty
million people divided among more than thirty ethnic groups.
As many foreign visitors, investors, scholars, and
academicians argue, compared to other countries in East
Africa— Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania—
"Kenya is an island of sanity".^
To potential investors and businessmen, Kenya was
regarded as capitalism's shining star on the African
continent.^ For many years, Kenya had been among the few
countries in sub-Saharan Africa that seemed to work both
politically and economically.

Indeed, Kenya's once peaceful

environment and economic and political stability played to
its advantage and lured foreign investors. Kenya also
benefitted from economic aid and the tourism industry.
fact, whenever the President and political leaders,
especially parliamentarians, addressed the public, they
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usually took credit for political tranquility and reminded
Kenyans that the rest of Africa was jealous of Kenya's
peaceful and prosperous climate.^
Despite its recent trend of backward political movement
and economic instability, Kenya has a modern
telecommunications network, a developing infrastructure, an
educated workforce, a free market economy, a government
bureaucracy that functions relatively well, a multi-party
system, and the rule of law.

Because of these factors,

Kenya became the second largest recipient of United States
economic aid in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s.
However, even with its good reputation, Kenya's
increasing corrupt practices have severely stained its
reputation and affected its economic growth.

According to a

survey conducted by Transparency International in 1995-96,
Kenya ranks as the third most corrupt nation in the world,
following Nigeria and Pakistan.^

George N. Ayittey also

contends that, "Corruption emerged in Kenya soon after
independence and got progressively worse...."®

He maintains

that "the first president of independent Kenya, Jomo
Kenyatta, and his family amassed a large fortune of land,
precious gems, ivory and casinos...."^

In short, Kenyatta

and his Kikuyu ethnic group controlled Kenya's economic and
political power base from the 1960s and 1970s.

When Daniel

arap Moi took over following Kenyatta's death, corruption
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became institutionalized and grew worse.® This assertion is
also supported by anonymous Kenya authors and scholars who
assert that, under Moi, "kickbacks, graft, and conflict of
interest are evident at all levels of government".^ It is
these authors' claim that, under Moi, the entire government
and society is plagued by large-scale political corruption,
bribery, extortion, favoritism, ethnicity, and general
mismanagement of the state bureaucracy and resources.
Due to high-scale corruption among the most high-ranking
political officials, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and many European countries have tremendously cut down
economic aid to Kenya citing large-scale corruption and the
failure of the Kenyan government to prosecute corrupt
officials.

For example, comments from the Danish

International Development Agency (DANIDA) state that:
In the past, corruption in Kenya was not widespread,
and the number of people involved was rather limited.
However, in recent years the extent seems to pervade
the whole society. The reason is partly on economic
development which increasingly puts pressure on the
individual family's economy, but probably primarily a
political structure which allows and at times even
encourages corruption.
Comparing the eras of Kenyatta and Moi in order to trace
the history of political corruption, Kivutha Kibwana et al.,
state that :
[Up to] 1969, corruption in Kenya was largely under
control and the country never featured among the
corrupt countries of Africa. This is attributed to the
checks and balances that existed, especially in terms
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of a fair Parliament, independent judiciary, effective
police force and a substantially free press...The
deliberate weakening and dismantling of political and
civil society institutions that could act as pressure
groups, during Moi's rule, especially after the
attempted coup d ’etat of 1982, dealt a severe blow to
the country's ability to control corruption.
The point these scholars are making is that it is during
Moi's nineteen years of rule that Kenya's

corruption has

worsened.
Additionally it is argued that corruption is a subject
that

people discuss gingerly if at all because of tremendous

fear

of government repression." Therefore, one

can argue

that Kenya's pervasive pattern of political corruption has
worked against its, ruining its once proud reputation, and
discouraging foreign investors and businesses that are
critical to Kenya's economic growth.

According to most

foreign investors, it is extremely difficult to start or do
business in Kenya given the demand of many illicit
tolls/payoffs and extortions by government officials.

As

reported by the Los Angeles Times. Kenya, a country that
once was regarded as a place that worked, has lost more than
other sub-Saharan African countries since acquiring its
reputation for corruption. This is because Kenya has
squandered much of its goodwill while surrounded by some of
the sorriest, war-torn, economically inept, politically
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unstable, and overall desperate countries Africa has to
offer.

THE KISUMU MOLASSES PLANT
The molasses project was initiated in 1977 under the
name Kenya Chemical and Food Corporation Ltd. as a joint
venture between the government, Chemfood Investment
Corporation of the United States, and Adrait International,
a subsidiary of Madhvani Group.
stock in Chemfood.

Madhavani owned 40% of the

The project was capitalized at 170

million Kenya Shillings of which the government invested
Shillings 86.7 million, making it the majority shareholder
with 51% of the share-holding.

Chemfood and Adrait invested

a total of 83.3 million shillings in equity, taking up 34%
and 15% share-holding, respectively.

The Madhavani Group,

an influential family of investors, invested 68 million
shillings.

The management of the project was entrusted to

Eximcorp, a company in which the Madhavani Group
participated actively.
Once it was completed, the project was expected to
consume some 110,000 tones of molasses per year to produce
20 million liters of power alcohol annually and about ten
other products.

These included 3,000 tones of citric acid,

1,800 tones of fresh baker's and activated dry yeast, and
2,160 tones of sulphuric acid.

The project was also
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designed to produce 6,800 tones of oxygen, 2,000 tones of
ammonium sulphate fertilizer, 6,000 tones of gypsum, 9,000
tonnes of carbon dioxide and methane gas, which was expected
to provide more than 50% of the projects total operating
requirements of combustible fuels and also create jobs.
After spending more than one billion shillings towards
constructing the plant, the project soon stalled and finally
collapsed due to bureaucratic corruption.

It was alleged

that some top government officials were demanding exorbitant
kickbacks to allocate contracts to businessmen, especially
foreign investors.

Indeed, the Kisumu Molasses Plant became

Kenya's most celebrated white elephant and cost a foreign
minister's life.

The ghastly murder of Robert Ouko was

caused by his continuous condemnation of Kenya's political
corruption, particularly among the top cabinet ministers.

NIGERIA
"Keeping an average Nigerian from being corrupt
is like keeping a goat from eating yam".
— Chinua Achebe
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with a
population of more than 120 million, thus accounting for a
quarter of sub-Saharan Africa's population.

Nigeria's 250

ethnic groups provide an environment of diversity.
Additionally, over the past few decades Nigeria has been an
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economic powerhouse, i.e., the largest oil-exporting country
on the continent.
Nigeria was a British colony until its independence in
1960.

Through the years, Nigeria has experienced or

suffered continuous political tensions based on regional,
religious, and ethnic lines.

For example, the northern

region of the country is dominated by the Hausa and Fulani
Muslims, while the south is dominated by the Christian
Yorubas.

The primary factor for these tensions and

conflicts is the desire to control the economic spoils— oil
and political leadership.
Larry Diamond asserts that, "Nigeria's ruinous political
cycles" have rendered its politically and economically
r e t a r d e d . S i n c e independence in 1960, Nigeria has seen
seven successful coups and many aborted ones.

The first

coup d'etat was in 1966 when a small group of army soldiers
of the Ibo tribe overthrew the government, citing political
corruption and government mismanagement.
successful coup was in 1983.

The most recent,

It was led by General Ibrahim

Gbandamasi Babangida, who until 1994 controlled the entire
country politically and economically with an iron fist.
Curiously enough, whenever a coup d'tat takes place,
rampant political corruption is mentioned to justify the
overthrow of the existing government.

Propaganda
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notwithstanding, political corruption flourishes regardless
of who is in power or what type of government— civilian or
military might be in control.

Indeed, like Kenya and other

sub-Saharan African countries, oppression and political
repression are routinely practiced to discourage public
uprisings.

In addition, there is a lack of existing

institutions in place to fight corruption.

Those few who

are brave enough to expose and condemn corruption often face
severe punishment for opposing or criticizing the
government.

Indeed, the 1995 executions of the Nigerian

anti-corruption activist, environmentalist, and poet Ken
Saro-Wiwa and hisn nine compatriots serves as a backdrop.
As Robert Williams observes, "When the foreign visitors
to Nigeria have finished complaining about Lagos and its
traffic jams.... it is usually time for the travelers' tales
of voracious and pervasive corruption".^® According to many
observers, Nigerians are the most corrupt people on the
continent and perhaps in the world.

This is partly due to

the severe economic imbalance between the many ethnic
groups.

While a few, especially the military, control the

oil resources and benefit from huge kickbacks and bribes,
the majority struggle to survive or make ends meet.
As reported in 1989 by the Christian Association of
Nigeria, more than 3,000 Nigerians held Swiss bank accounts,
making the Nigerians the majority of Third World patrons of
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Swiss b a n k s . I n fact, during the oil boom of the 1980s,
Nigeria was the only country in sub-Saharan Africa where
government scandals and political corruption exceeded
imagination.

Government officials were competing for

private Jaguar aircraft.

Unfortunately, since the good old

days of easy oil money are gone due to world markets, and
excessive individual greed, and government mismanagement,
Nigeria has become a den of corrupt officials in search of
an easy way to make money while the sun shines.

Therefore,

political corruption has flourished no matter what type of
government or ethnic group is in power.

But one can make a

strong case that generally corruption has not been organized
or directed by a single individual or family as is the case
in many other sub-Saharan African countries.

This is to

state that, even though Nigeria is the first or second most
corrupt nation in the world, it has never produced a
military predator of the stature of the late president
Mobutu Sese Seko of the former Zaire.

ZAIRE/CONGO
"If you steal, do not steal too much at a time.
You may be arrested. Steal cleverly (yiba na
mayale), little by little".
— Mobutu Sese Seko
Perhaps there is no country in sub-Saharan Africa that
is as systemically corrupt as the former Zaire.

According
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to Stanislav Andreski, Zaire was the world Kleptocratic
state— a country that steals.’® Zaire, a former Belgian
colony then known as the Belgian Congo gained independence
in 1961.

It is known to possess some of the most fertile

lands and prodigious mineral deposits and other resources in
Africa, particularly rubber, copper, diamonds, and iron
ore.

Like Nigeria, Zaire is composed of ethnic groups that

are constantly at odds with one another.
In fact, in the early 1960s, at one time or another,
the Congo was at the point of disintegrating because of
tribal ideological conflict.

However, with the

assassination of Patrice Lumumba and assistance from the
United States Central Intelligent Agency General Joseph
Mobutu overthrew the government in 1964, renamed the country
Zaire, and emerged as a military dictator.

Mobutu's

pervasive corruption cost Zaire's economy dearly,
contributing to unimaginable poverty and suffering for the
entire country, while Mobutu remained among the wealthiest
billionaires in the world.
Scholars argue that in the former Zaire everyone was on
the take because that was how the system was structured.
George N. Ayittey asserts that in Zaire, one needed to know
two things to survive— that is, "whom do I see and how much
will it cost".

Mobutu was known as the cock that left no

hen untouched and the all-powerful warrior who stole on a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

202

massive s c a l e . I n fact, it was claimed that Mobutu had
before his death between five to ten billion dollars in the
Swiss banks and that he "could clear the national debt by
writing a personal c h e c k " . I n taking from the government,
Mobutu once advised government officials during a speech
that if they had to steal they better do it clandestinely,
intelligently, and systematically or else they risked being
caught and prosecuted.^®

Undoubtedly, Mobutu practiced what

he preached— a leader who stole cleverly from his own
country.

In fact, often when he was asked about his

fortune, he would take pride and remind the people that his
money in Swiss banks did not involve his other wealth— real
estate, villas, chateaus, castles, building complexes, jets,
and cattle ranches scattered all over the world.
As Blaine Harden claims, "Of all the countries in subSaharan Africa, Zaire has the ugliest reputation for statesponsored corruption. Mobutu has legitimatized and
systematized graft...kleptocracy".

Similarly, as noted by

Harden in the The Washington Post:
Zaire is a den of unregenerate thieves. Its president
and top ministers mouth the free-market lingo that the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the
Reagan administration like to hear, while continuing to
fill foreign bank accouhts with loot. No government
project is begun without payoff. Payoffs are so
ubiquitous and so exorbitant that many projects are
never completed. Civil servants regard extortion as
part of the job description.®^
Therefore, like other countries, corruption ruined the
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former Zaire and instilled a culture whereby the powerful
exploited the less powerful who in turn exploited the
powerless.■’® From top to bottom, bribes and corruption were
the sure way to do business in Zaire.

One Belgian diplomat

referred to this transaction as follows:

"It's like

termites nibbling away at the structure of a society".®'*
Indeed, looting and stealing from government has become a
Zairean motto.

Thus, even though Zaire is one of the "most

blessed countries with some of the richest mineral reserves
in the world, [it] had managed by 1988 to become one of the
eight poorest countries in the world".®® Undoubtedly, this
is the position that Zaire or to-day's Democratic Republic
of Congo holds under its new leader, Laurent Kabila.
Some African scholars think that Kabila is not any
different from the late Mobutu, because his rule is
described as dictatorial and his entourage as neoMobutuists.

Secondly, because he comes from Katanga, in a

Copper-rich region, the desire to fill his pockets is high
because there is a lack of constitutional or other checks
and balances to ensure that the corruption endemic to
Mobutu's Zaire does not become endemic to Kabila's Congo.®®
Furthermore, for the short period he has been the president,
he has made many concessions with diamond, copper, and iron
ore mining businesses from foreign countries and South
Africa and is believed to be taking kickbacks and
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benefitting from the country's natural resources— more
political corruption.

Additionally, his idea of changing

the name of the country from Zaire to the Democratic
Republic of Congo is not a magic bullet for the problems
that face the country, especially political corruption.
Indeed, according to one anonymous author, changing the name
of Zaire was "like swapping a Rolls Royce for a Ford Escort,
a diamond for a piece of glass, a princess for a whore".
Similarly, as the Africa proverb says, "You cannot improve
your child's behavior by changing his name..."38 but rather
teach him how to behave by example.
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CHAPTER 7

CONTROLLING POLITICAL CORRUPTION
The literature on political corruption identifies four
types of strategies important to minimizing or eliminating
corruption.

They are: societal, legal, market, and

political.®

Patrick Dobel, W. Etzioni-Halevy, and M.

McMullan argue that societal strategies place emphasis on
the determination of a common standard of morality against
which politically corrupt behaviors can be measured.
Vigilance by the members of society and education to make it
relatively costly for individuals to engage in corruption
are also emphasized.®
Legally, it is believed that government behavior can be
constrained effectively by the law.

This can be done by

creating or choosing special commissions of inquiry, special
courts, or special prosecutors to probe individuals and
groups accused of political corruption, bribery, or illegal
transactions.

Where evidence gathered points to corruption,

it is up to the judicial system/courts alone to judge and
render punishment to offenders based on national laws.®
The market-related strategies to the clean-up of
corruption emphasize that there is a relationship between
the structure of the markets, bureaucracy, and the incidents
207
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of corruption.

Thus, the prescribed cure is less government

regulation and bureaucratic redtape, and greater reliance on
markets for the allocation of resources.

It is Bayley,

Macrae, Rose-Ackerman, and Tilman's assertion that such an
approach, however, appears to emphasize the manipulation of
outcomes within existing rules instead of proper reform of
the rules.

The fault is not with the market but with the

rules that regulate the market.

Since rules define market

outcomes, greater reliance on markets for the allocation of
resources without reforming existing rules will have little
effect on outcomes, including government corruption.

Unless

there is effective reform of the socio-political rules
within which the market functions, incentives for
opportunism will remain and corruption will continue
unabated. “
Political strategies for political corruption stress the
decentralization of the public sector.

It is argued that

corruption arises from the concentration of power in the
hands of a few political elites— politicians and
bureaucrats— and that a process which provides citizens with
greater access to public institutions will significantly
minimize opportunities for corruption within the country.
Under this approach, an effective cleanup program is
expected to emphasize political deregulation and the
subsequent expansion of opportunities for citizens to
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participate in governance.

Indeed, social scientists and

decision-makers who favor this administrative reform as a
way to minimize the incidence of corruption support
increasing the legal compensation of bureaucrats in order to
reduce the chances that civil servants will seek extra-legal
income.®
Mbaku John Mukum contends that the impetus to clean up
corruption can be provided primarily by political exigency
rather than by genuine interest in the efficient functioning
of the nation's political and economic institutions.

In

several countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa,
post-coup commissions of inquiry are usually designed to
discredit the ousted government and help incoming elites
gain recognition and legitimacy.

Incumbents also use the

cleanup programs to help them stay in power and continue to
monopolize the supply of legislation and the allocation of
resources.

An incumbent leader faced with deteriorating

economic and social conditions and a challenge from
opposition parties or groups may initiate a campaign to
reduce corruption within the administration in an effort to
direct attention away from existing problems and the
government's inability or unwillingness to provide effective
solutions for those problems.® However, as Gillespie and
Okruhlik state, whether or not corruption cleanups are used
for political exigency and how often is determined by
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several factors including "the personal values of the head
of state, challenges from counter elites, and popular
discontent arising from socio-economic conditionswithin
a given country.
In several African countries, politicians regularly use
cleanup campaigns to help them stay in power.

Cleanup

programs can be used to discredit members of a previous
regime, to destroy the reputations of leaders of the
opposition, and to improve support among the population for
the incumbent regime.®

For instance, all political

uprisings/revolutions or coups d'etat in Nigeria, Congo,
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, Angola, and elsewhere in
Africa cite government corruption, mismanagement,
ineffective bureaucracy, and malaise as the primary reasons
for a new government and leadership.

Additionally, even if

a government seriously and honestly wishes to clean up
corruption, existing approaches suffer from at least one
obstacle : their success depends on the effectiveness of the
counteracting agencies.

In Africa, cleanup programs depend

upon the judicial system, the police, and the press, and
assume that those agencies are appropriately constrained by
the law and are free of corruption and/or are independent
or free of government manipulation and control.

Because the

judicial systems and the police rank high in corrupt
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behavior themselves, the cleanup programs backed by these
agencies are likely to be ineffective.

Therefore, to ensure

that the cleanup programs are effective, a selection of
appropriate new rules must be established to make sure that
the new social contract is capable of generating the outcome
desired by the society.®
However, given the fact that political corruption has
passed the alarming and entered the fatal stage in subSaharan Africa, only time can tell whether this social ill
can be cleaned up and cured.

According to Joseph N.

Weatherby et al., "there is no magic bullet for the problems
that Africa faces".

They argue that expecting a total

eradication of corruption in Africa would be unrealistic
because in most developing nations corruption still runs
large.

Nonetheless, they argue that political corruption

can be reduced "down to manageable levels"®® if government
agencies, political leaders, and the public at large play
their roles.

As for Africa, they state that the solution

for corruption lies with the Africans themselves.

Surely,

without the African people realizing how vicious and
damaging corruption can be and what it can do, short-term
remedies or band-aids and economic aid would be hopeless and
ineffective in curing this problem in the long term.®®
Wraith and Simpkins suggest some cures for corruption
in Africa. These remedies are:

One, loyalty to the nation-
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state rather than family, clan, or tribe.

Two, the spread

of education to enable the public to understand and
comprehend the effects of corruption.

Three, a democratic

state and environment to allow public freedoms of speech and
press in order to allow people to criticize the government,
condemn corrupt officials, and campaign against corruption
and bribery.

Four, to create a climate conducive for

encouraging commerce, open markets and trade, and a strong
industrial sector.

Five, to create jobs and increase wages

in the government sector and elsewhere in order to raise the
living standards and to discourage corruption.

Six, to

inculcate a concept of diffusion of power among ethnic
groups.

Seven, to reduce the civil service and decentralize

government agencies.

Eight, to apply merit rather than

ascriptive measures when allocating jobs, promotions,
business licenses, government loans, contracts,
scholarships, and incentives.

Nine, to encourage the growth

of wealth and status throughout the whole society.

And ten,

to ensure an independent judicial system and vigorous law
enforcement.
The truth of the matter is that, even with these
remedies, African people and governments are loath to adopt
them.

For instance, in Africa, parochial loyalty,

tribalism, and ethnicity predominate.

When the issue of

nationalism comes up, Africans place family, clan, and tribe
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before country.

Often, Africans identify themselves not as

Zaireans, Nigerians, or Kenyans, but rather as Katangans,
Yorubas, Kalenjins, etc.
Similarly, due to the high rate of illiteracy, the
majority of Africans, especially those in the rural areas,
lack an understanding of the workings and effects of
corruption.

Furthermore, many African nation-states have

autocratic regimes masquerading as democracies.

Indeed,

dictators stalk Africa like wild cats in the night.

These

tyrants run the gamut from Sani Abacha to Omar Bongo, Daniel
arap Moi to Yoweri Museveni, Robert Mugabe to Laurent
Kabila, to name a few.
The freedoms of speech, press, and other human rights
regarded as basic in the West are still non-existent in many
African nations.

Due to this, government critics and anti

corruption crusaders are severely oppressed, hunted down,
tortured, detained without trial, imprisoned for life, or
murdered.

Put simply, criticizing the government or the top

political elites and leaders is a state offense or treason.
Thus, under these circumstances, political corruption
continues to flourish because people fear to speak out
publicly.
In Africa, political power is centered upon a few
elites or groups based on clan or tribe.

In fact, many

African countries are ruled by a family, clan, or tribe
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because there is a lack of balance of power or wealth among
ethnic groups.

Furthermore, tribalism and nepotism, the two

factors that encourage corruption, flourish unabated and
uncheckedFinally, in Africa, judicial systems still depend upon
the government of the "Big Men" for orders.

Judicial

supremacy and independent judicial review are non-existent.
In fact, justice systems in Africa usually serve the needs
and wishes of the "Strong Men" who consider themselves and
their cliques above the law.

Under this condition,

political leaders and their cliques go unprosecuted and
unpunished for crimes of political corruption and this all
contributes to choking the economies and development of
their countries.

CONCLUSION
This thesis has unearthed many points that need to be
reemphasized or highlighted.

First, political corruption is

a universal phenomenon that afflicts every society in both
developed and developing nations.
from being a novelty.

Second, corruption is far

Its practice is as ancient as other

social phenomena such as violence, crime, or prostitution.
Third, the meaning of political corruption has changed with
time, place, and space.

Fourth, its definition is elusive
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and/or hard to pin down; corruption means different things
to different people.
In contemporary Africa, political corruption has at
least some of its roots in the past— the legacy of
colonialism.

In sub-Saharan Africa, political corruption

cannot be understood outside a framework of the legacy of
colonialism, neo-colonialism, the "Big Men", tribalism,
underdevelopment, frustrated economies, and a lack of
enlightened leadership or techno-politicians.

Throughout

the continent there is a general consensus that corruption
is morally wrong a economically, politically, and socially
devastating.

However, it is regarded as a way of life and

of doing business and an outstanding characteristic of
African public life.

For many government workers,

corruption is an alternative or "extra-legal" means of
supplementing their wages and/or survival.

Political

corruption permeates the entire societal fabric of the
African continent and poses serious political, social, and
economic problems.

It exists in both private and public

sectors with the latter recording the highest incidences of
corruption that place a heavy burden on the African people.
Finally, a relatively large number of African people
recognizes the presence of corruption but lack the power to
reduce it and fear to speak out due to government
repression.
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The need to eradicate political corruption in subSaharan Africa requires a concerted effort of the political
elites; governmental and non-governmental institutions;
political parties; intellectuals; independent agencies—
anti-corruption squads and national inquiry commissions,
special court and the Prevention of Corruption Acts;
constitutional reforms; democracy and plurality of political
parties; the introduction of the bill of rights— freedom of
speech and the press; transparency and accountability among
government officials; and the enlightened public at large.
Above all, to wage a merciless war on political corruption
an enlightened leadership is needed.
It is the contention of this thesis that, political
corruption can be defined, contained, reduced, or defeated
in sub-Saharan Africa.

However, it is impossible to prevent

it completely once it has taken deep roots and manifests
itself in a large scale (as is the case in many countries).
Nonetheless, there are some signs of hope that political
corruption can indeed be contained in sub-Saharan African
countries as has occurred in South Africa.
But to be successful in controlling political
corruption, we must treat corruption as a disease such as
cancer.

We must therefore,

understand the nature of the

disease, know its hosts, its distribution, causes and
conditions, its consequences, and its remedies.
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Unfortunately, some countries have displayed a marked
propensity to corruption and certain remedial treatments
have conspicuously failed, especially in Nigeria and
Zaire/Congo.

As the saying goes, however, "where there is a

will, there is a way".
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